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Government Data Mining:
The Need for a Legal Framework
Fred H. Cate*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States government has long sought data about individuals
for a wide variety of important public purposes. The process of collecting
this information was often time-consuming and expensive and resulted in
data that were difficult to use because of the form in which they were cap-
tured. The Supreme Court described the effect as “practical obscurity.”1
Much of the “privacy” Americans have enjoyed results from the fact that it
was simply too expensive or laborious to find out intimate data about them.
In the twenty-first century, technology and law have combined to erode
the protection for personal privacy previously afforded by practical obscu-
rity. Advances in digital technologies have greatly expanded the volume of
personal data created as individuals engage in everyday activities. “Today,
our biographies are etched in the ones and zeros we leave behind in daily
digital transactions,”2 Professor Kathleen Sullivan has written. Moreover,
technology has contributed to an explosion not only in the ubiquity of data,
but also in the range of parties with physical access to those data and in the
practical and economic ability of those parties to collect, store, share, and
use those digital footprints.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the Fourth
Amendment to restrict the government’s access to data held by third parties.
In the 1976 decision United States v. Miller, the Court held that because
there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in information held by a
* Distinguished Professor and Director of the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research,
Indiana University; Senior Policy Advisor, Center for Information Policy Leadership at Hunton
& Williams LLP. The author has participated in drafting a number of documents cited in this
article as the reporter for the American Law Institute’s project on Principles of the Law on
Government Access to and Use of Personal Digital Information, counsel to the Department of
Defense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, reporter for the third report of the
Markle Foundation Force on National Security in the Information Age, and a panelist at the
Cantigny Conference on Counterterrorism Technology and Privacy, organized by the Standing
Committee on Law and National Security of the American Bar Association. The author also
serves as a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Technical and Privacy
Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals. I am grateful
for the instruction of my colleagues in these settings; however, the views expressed herein
should not be attributed to them or to the sponsoring organizations. I also appreciate the gener-
ous help of Professor Craig Bradley, Beth E. Cate, Benjamin Keele, Michael Riskin, Professor
Paul Schwartz, and Stefaan Verh. I alone am responsible for any errors.
1 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989).
2 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in THE
WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 128, 131 (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1151435
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third party, even if the third party possesses it because of a legal obligation
to do so, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the government’s seizure
of such data.3 The Miller third-party exception thus invites an end run
around the Fourth Amendment. As serious a threat to privacy as this may
have posed when Miller was decided, the danger is far greater today, when
for commercial and regulatory reasons, individuals’ everyday activities are
routinely captured in digital records.
The government faces new and intense pressure to collect and use per-
sonal data. Much of that pressure reflects the conviction that greater reliance
on digital data will reduce costs and enhance convenience, speed, efficiency,
and accountability. Perhaps the greatest source of that pressure, however, is
the fear of terrorist attacks and the widely shared view, as the National Com-
mission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly referred to
as the 9-11 Commission) Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton testified before Con-
gress in November 2005, that the inability of federal agencies to marshal and
share information about suspected terrorists and their activities “was the sin-
gle greatest failure of our government in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks.”4
This indictment has led Congress and the President to expand the au-
thority of the government to collect personal data through mandatory disclo-
sure, seizure, independent creation, and purchase.5  It has also helped to fuel
an apparently insatiable government appetite for access to and retention of
personal data, especially from the vast databases routinely maintained by the
private sector. The government uses these data sets for a spectrum of data
mining activities, ranging from inquiries on specific individuals and the peo-
ple with whom they interact to broad searches for unusual or predetermined
patterns of activities or relationships.6
Data mining poses significant legal and policy issues. Many of these
concern the government’s access to data, especially from the private sector.
In the absence of either practical obscurity or effective legal privacy protec-
tions, the government has unprecedented and virtually unlimited access to an
extraordinary volume and variety of personal data on the behaviors, attrib-
utes, resources, associates, and beliefs of individuals who have done nothing
to warrant suspicion. In addition, the government’s use of the data creates
serious concerns. Although data mining can have real consequences for indi-
viduals identified, it occurs without legal guarantees for the accuracy or ap-
propriateness of the data or the searches, redress for people injured by being
falsely identified as posing a threat, or judicial or legislative oversight. In
3 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976); see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
4 Federal Support for Homeland Security Information Sharing: Role of the Information
Sharing Program Manager: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence Information Shar-
ing and Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 23 (2005)
(statement of Lee Hamilton, Vice Chairman, 9/11 Public Discourse Project).
5 See, e.g., Alexandra Markes, Privacy Advocates Fight for Ground Lost After 9/11,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2007, at 2.
6 See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining, in MCGRAW-HILL
HANDBOOK OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1063, 1065-66 (David G. Kamien ed., 2005).
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fact, most government data mining today occurs in a legal vacuum outside
the scope of the Fourth Amendment and without a statutory or regulatory
framework.
The absence of a legal regime governing data mining not only fuels
privacy concerns, but also runs the risk of compromising the very objectives
that data mining is designed to serve by permitting the use of outdated, inac-
curate, and inappropriate data. It denies government officials guidance as to
what is and is not acceptable conduct. The lack of a modern, coherent legal
regime interferes with the ability of businesses and other possessors of po-
tentially relevant databases to know when they can legally share information
with the government. It slows the development of new and promising data
mining programs, undermining research into this potentially important tool
and hampering appropriate data sharing. And it significantly undercuts the
confidence of the public and of policymakers that data mining will be car-
ried out effectively or with appropriate attention to protecting privacy and
other civil liberties.
This Article examines some of the critical issues surrounding the gov-
ernment’s collection and use of personal data for data mining, especially for
law enforcement and national security purposes—the area of greatest growth
and most recent controversy. In particular, this Article focuses on the failure
of law and the legal system to respond to the proliferation of data mining
and the dramatic technological changes that make it possible. Part II surveys
some of the many recent data mining efforts initiated by the government,
especially in the law enforcement and counter-terrorism areas, and the range
of government authority to seize, require the disclosure of, or purchase third-
party data. Part III examines the Supreme Court’s exclusion in Miller and
subsequent cases of third-party data from the privacy protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Part IV addresses Congress’s privacy legislation and its
failure to fill the gap created by Miller or to respond to the proliferation in
government data mining. Part V suggests the range of issues that these pro-
grams raise in the face of a legal vacuum. Part VI offers recommendations
for marshalling the potential power of data mining for appropriate uses while
protecting personal privacy. Although addressed specifically to national se-
curity and law enforcement data mining, these recommendations apply
equally to government data mining for other purposes.7
7 This Article does not address the regulation of data collection and use in the private
sector. Clearly, these issues relate to government data mining, since, as this article argues, the
private sector is a major source of personal data used by the government, and the controversy
over public-sector data mining affects the debate over private-sector activities. However, the
issues are simply too broad to address together effectively in a single article. Moreover, there
are important conceptual distinctions: the Fourth Amendment applies only to government
searches and seizures, and only the government’s data collection is entirely free from the con-
straints of competitive markets because only the government has the power to compel the
production of personal data. Finally, there are important practical distinctions, because, as
described in greater detail below, even when Congress has enacted privacy protections applica-
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II. DATA MINING INITIATIVES
A. Data Mining
“Data mining” is defined in many different ways but is perhaps best
understood as encompassing a wide spectrum of data-based activities rang-
ing from “subject-based” searches for information on specified individuals
to “pattern-based” searches for unusual or predetermined patterns of activi-
ties or relationships.8 Between these two ends are “relational” searches,
which start with an individual but then reach out to determine who com-
municates or otherwise interacts with whom, and “data matching,” which
involves combining two or more sets of data looking for matches or
discrepancies.9
Government agencies have long made use of subject-based, relational,
and data matching searches. For example, law enforcement officials often
search for a specific suspect (e.g., the driver of the car, the person with the
fingerprint at the scene of the crime). They also frequently rely on relational
searches (e.g., who knew the murder victim, who frequented the drug
house). Data matching is also widely used, for example, by tax officials who
compare individual tax filings with the records of financial institutions and
employers, or national security officials, who compare flight manifests and
visa applications with lists of known and suspected terrorists.
Pattern-based searches are a more recent innovation for government
agencies, although they have long been used by commercial entities for tar-
ble to the private sector, it has consistently exempted the provision of personal data to the
government. See infra text accompanying notes 191-98. R
8 See Minow & Cate, supra note 6, at 1065-66. R
9 There is a broad spectrum of definitions of “data mining.” At one end are the narrow
definitions such as that identified in the General Accountability Office’s May 2004 report on
government data mining: “the application of database technology and techniques—such as
statistical analysis and modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data
and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 1
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf. At the other end of the spec-
trum are far broader definitions. For example, the Department of Defense Technology and
Privacy Advisory Committee in 2004 defined the term to include “searches of one or more
electronic databases of information concerning U.S. persons, by or on behalf of an agency or
employee of the government.” TECH. AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, at viii (2004) [hereinafter,
TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY].
This Article employs the more comprehensive definition of data mining described above, in
part because of the changing nature and difficulty of distinguishing among different data anal-
ysis techniques. The broader the search criteria, and the more people who will be identified by
them, the more pattern-like subject-based searches become. Even when a subject-based search
starts with a known suspect, it can be transformed into a pattern-based search as investigators
target individuals for investigation solely because of apparently innocent connections with the
suspect. The more tenuous the connection, the more like a pattern-based search it becomes. In
addition, I prefer the broader definition in the belief that rules that apply more broadly, albeit
with appropriate sensitivity to the distinguishing characteristics of different types of data min-
ing, are more useful than a large number of narrower rules.
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get marketing and risk assessment.10 Businesses develop a pattern of attrib-
utes or behaviors that their good customers have in common and then search
databases to find people meeting those patterns. Over the past decade, gov-
ernment agencies have experimented with applying similar technologies to
other activities, such as detecting fraud or tax evasion.11 After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, pattern-based data mining struck many ob-
servers as a promising tool for law enforcement and national security. If
government officials could develop models of what criminal or terrorist be-
havior might look like and then search for those patterns across a sufficiently
broad range of information, observers hoped it would be possible to detect
criminals or terrorists, perhaps even before they executed their nefarious en-
terprises. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress required the new
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to “establish and utilize . . .
data-mining and other advanced analytical tools” to “access, receive, and
analyze data to detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United
States.”12
A 2004 report by the then-General Accounting Office (“GAO”) found
that forty-two federal departments—including every cabinet-level agency
that responded to the survey—engaged in, or were planning to engage in,
122 pattern-based data mining efforts involving personal information.13
Thirty-six of those involve accessing data from the private sector; forty-six
involve sharing data among federal agencies.14 Fourteen data mining pro-
grams in the GAO report are concerned with “[a]nalyzing intelligence and
detecting terrorist activities” and fifteen involve “[d]etecting criminal activ-
ities or patterns.”15 Of these twenty-nine national security and law enforce-
ment programs, all but four use personal data.16 The following section
examines a cross-section of government data mining programs involving
third-party data, many of which were not included in the GAO’s 2004 survey
even though they were ongoing at the time.
B. Government Data Mining Programs
1. Administrative and Regulatory Programs
The government today increasingly relies on personal data—obtained
not only from third parties, but also directly from individuals—to administer
social service programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and workers’
10 See JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SE-
CURITY: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2007).
11 Id.
12 6 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1), (d)(14) (2000).
13 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 9, at 3, 27-64 tbls. 2-25. R
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id. at 8 tbl. 1.
16 See id. at 10 fig. 1.
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compensation insurance; to administer tax programs and collect revenue; to
issue licenses for many personal, business, and professional activities; to
support hundreds of regulatory regimes ranging from voter registration and
political campaign contributor disclosures to employee identity verification
to child support obligation enforcement; to maintain vital records about ma-
jor lifecycle events, including birth, marriage, divorce, adoption, and death;
and to operate facilities such as toll roads and national parks. The role of
personal information collected as part of these programs is striking and re-
flects what Professor Paul Schwartz has described as the “data processing
model of administrative control.”17 In this model, government agencies be-
come largely information processors, substituting information-based deter-
minations for what previously might have involved subjective judgment by
clerks, who feed data into computers and act on the result, for professionals
who assess and evaluate independently. The increased reliance on personal
data helps to provide services to a larger population, diminishes the per-
ceived inequality of subjective determinations, reduces the costs of litigating
decisions and maintaining more skilled personnel, and enhances accountabil-
ity. “Compared to its historic role, the state today depends upon the availa-
bility of vast quantities of information, and much of the data it now collects
relates to identifiable individuals.”18
Combined with the twentieth-century expansion of government services
and oversight into the market and the family, the net effect of the evolution
towards a data processing model of administration is that “[b]ureaucracies
now use data processing to manage information about every aspect of human
existence. . . . Data are now gathered about every individual before birth,
during life, and after death.”19 It is no exaggeration to say that
“[i]nformation is the lifeblood of regulatory policy,”20 and “[r]egulators
depend on information for nearly everything they do.”21
a. Government Benefits and Social Service Programs
Many of the government’s data-based programs involve the delivery of
social services, which would be “impossible without detailed information on
the citizen as client, customer, or simply person to be controlled.”22 The
largest of these programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and workers’
compensation, involve most Americans.23 The personal information col-
17 Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (1992) (emphasis in
original).
18 Id. at 1332.
19 Id. at 1328-29.
20 Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: In-
formational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 285 (2004).
21 Id.
22 Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1332. R
23 Other social service programs include Medicaid, Social Security disability insurance,
Supplemental Security Income, WIC (Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
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lected under these and similar programs includes identifying data (such as
Social Security Number (“SSN”)) about the applicants and family members,
extensive financial information, health information, and data on what prod-
ucts or services are purchased or consumed. The information is collected not
only from the data subject—the person to whom the information pertains—
but also from third parties such as health care providers, employers, and
service providers. The Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s”) Numeri-
cal Identification File (“NUMIDENT”), for example, maintains identifying
information, including name, birth date, citizenship, and SSN, on more than
441 million individuals, and the information is accessible to other govern-
ment agencies and private employers.24
b. Taxes
The government also collects and stores extensive personal information
to administer tax programs and collect revenue. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (“IRS”) estimated in 2002 that it collected data on 116 million individ-
ual taxpayers, 45 million fully or partially self-employed individuals and
small businesses, 210,000 larger corporations, and 2.4 million not-for-profit
entities.25 These data include not only self-reported information on identity,
income, and activities, but also a vast array of third-party data that include
both identifying information (such as SSN) and financial data.26 As Profes-
sor Lillian BeVier has written, “[i]n part because the Internal Revenue Code
has become such a complex maze of deductions, exemptions, surcharges,
and credits, citizens cannot pay taxes without at the same time providing the
government with quite detailed information about their families, jobs, invest-
ments, misfortunes, and favorite charities.”27 In addition, individuals are re-
quired to provide even more personal data to private-sector institutions so
Infants and Children), Nutrition Program for the Elderly, Child and Adult Care Food Program,
School Lunch and Breakfast Program, Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and unemployment
insurance.
24 Employment Eligibility Verification Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Frederick G.
Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Comm’r for Disability and Income Security Programs, Social
Security Admin.), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=6093.
25 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH § 357 OF THE
UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO IN-
TERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 12 n.11 (2002).
26 See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS Updates National
Research Program for Individuals IR-2007-113 (June 6, 2007), available at http://www.irs.
gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=171023,00.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
27 Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 456
(1995).
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that those institutions have the data they need to comply with their tax re-
porting requirements.28
c. Employment
Under the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ new E-Verify
employment verification program, within three days of each new employee’s
hiring date many U.S. employers must enter basic identification informa-
tion—including SSN and name, date of birth, citizen status claimed by em-
ployee, and other data—into an automated government database.29 The
database attempts to match the data against the SSA’s NUMIDENT database
or, for noncitizens, DHS databases.30
Employers are also required to report to their “State Directory of New
Hires” the name, address, and SSN of all new hires within twenty days of
their hiring date, and then to withhold from their paychecks any child
support payments they may owe.31 The states can determine whether any
amount is owed by matching data with another federal database, the Federal
Case Registry, which centralizes data from federally mandated State Case
Registries about all child support orders established or modified on or after
October 1, 1998.32 Even parents who are not in the New Hires Directory
might be located because Congress also has mandated the creation of the
Federal Parent Locator Service (“FPLS”).33 This service accesses data from,
and provides data to, not only the New Hires Directory but also federal tax
authorities, the Department of State passport database, private-sector finan-
cial institutions, insurers and their agents, and other public- and private-sec-
tor sources.34
2. Law Enforcement
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) maintains extensive
databases in its Criminal Justice Information Services Division (“CJISD”)
that collect data from, and supply data to, a wide array of public- and pri-
28 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, EMPLOYMENT TAXES FOR
BUSINESSES, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=172179,00.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2008).
29 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I AM AN
EMPLOYER . . .  HOW DO I . . . USE E-VERIFY?, M-655 (2007), available at http://www.uscis.
gov/files/nativedocuments/E4_english.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
30 See Employment Eligibility Verification Systems, supra note 24, at 5 (testimony of Rich-
ard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Gen. Accountability Office),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07924t.pdf.
31 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 653a (2000).
32 See id. § 654a(e).
33 42 U.S.C.A. § 653 (West 2007).
34 Id. § 653(e)(2).
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vate-sector entities.35 For example, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification Service (“IAFIS”) provides for automated data matching with
three fingerprint databases containing 51 million records: the criminal his-
tory database; the civil file, containing records on individuals who have been
required to submit fingerprints for employee background checks, security
clearances, state licensure, and other non-criminal purposes; and the Un-
solved Latent File, which includes fingerprints from crime scenes that could
not be matched with either of the other databases.36 The FBI’s Next Genera-
tion Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System will not only
allow for faster data mining, but also allow matching of other biometric
identifiers.37
The FBI already collects data on one of those additional biometric iden-
tifiers—DNA. The Bureau’s Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) in-
cludes separate databases for DNA collected from: convicted criminals,
arrestees, and parolees; forensic profiles from crime scenes; unidentified
human remains; and missing persons and their relatives.38 CODIS intercon-
nects state and local databases to facilitate faster data matching. The Bureau
has announced plans to spend $1 billion to build a more comprehensive bio-
metric database.39
In addition, the FBI houses the national sex offender database, which
aggregates information from the federally mandated state registries.40 States
are required to share information in their registries with the FBI, and vice
versa, within three days of receiving it.41 Registration is required of any per-
son convicted of a “sexually violent offense” or a “criminal offense against
a victim who is a minor.”42 The information that must be provided includes
the offender’s name, address, photograph, and fingerprints. Some state laws
also require that the offender supply a biological specimen.43
The CJISD’s National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) aggregates
extensive data about missing persons, unidentified persons, criminal sus-
pects wanted by law enforcement, sex offenders, federal prisoners, persons
35 See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dep’t of Justice, Fingerprint Identification Records
System (1999), http://foia.fbi.gov/firs552.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
36 See Jeff Carlyle, FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, at 2, http://finger
print.nist.gov/standard/presentations/archives/IAFISoverview_Feb_2005.pdf (Feb. 2006).
37 Jason Miller, FBI Expanding Access to Fingerprint Database, FCW.com, Aug. 22,
2007, http://www.fcw.com/online/news/103568-1.html.
38 See Kimberly A. Polanco, The Fourth Amendment Challenge to DNA Sampling of Ar-
restees Pursuant to the Justice for All Act of 2004, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 483, 489
(2005).
39 See Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2007, at A1.
40 Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13701 (2000); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000).
41 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(b)(2) (West 2007).
42 42 U.S.C. § 14072(b) (2000).
43 See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender
Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 332-33 (2006) (citations omitted).
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on parole or probation, suspected terrorists, gangs, persons enrolled in the
U.S. Marshal Service’s Witness Security Program, victims of identity theft,
foreign fugitives, and stolen vehicles and property.44 In 2003, the NCIC con-
tained 71 million state criminal history files.45
The FBI aggregates data from multiple databases into its Investigative
Data Warehouse (“IDW”).46 According to press briefings given by the FBI
in 2006, the IDW contains more than 659 million records, which come from
50 FBI and outside government agency sources.47 The system’s data mining
tools are so sophisticated that they can handle many variations in names and
other data, including up to twenty-nine variants of birth dates. The 13,000
agents and analysts who use the system average one million queries a
month.48
3. National Security
a. Financial Institution Reporting
The government requires extensive data reporting by financial insti-
tutions as part of its counter-terrorism efforts. The Bank Secrecy Act, as
amended in 2001 by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
(“USA PATRIOT Act”),49 requires financial institutions and a wide range of
other businesses to report to the government on certain transactions that are
“determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, regulatory,
intelligence, and counter-terrorism matters.”50 The nation’s 24,000 banks and
credit unions, as well as broker-dealers and commodity traders, must file
Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) concerning suspicious financial
transactions. More than 160,000 money service businesses (such as checking
cashers and money transmitters) must register with the Department of Trea-
sury. Currency Transaction Reports (“CTRs”) for cash or coin transactions
of $10,000 or more must be filed by financial institutions, the Post Office,
casinos, travel agencies, pawnbrokers, real estate agents, automobile and
boat retailers, jewelers, and anyone who accepts a check, travelers’ check, or
44 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dep’t of Justice, National Crime Information Center, http:/
/www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ncic_brochure.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
45 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RECORD SYSTEMS STATIS-
TICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crs.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
46 See Intelligence Reform – FBI and Homeland Security: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (testimony of John S. Pistole, Deputy Director,
FBI), http://intelligence.senate.gov/070125/pistole.pdf.
47 Ellen Nakashima, FBI Shows Off Counterterrorism Database, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2006, at A6.
48 Id.
49 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections in numerous
titles of U.S.C.).
50 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 25, at 4. R
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money order.51 The reports are received by the IRS and by the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).
In 1996, these two agencies received 15,994,484 CTRs and 1,049,149
SARs.52 FinCEN has collected and stored more than 75 million reports over
the past decade.53 According to a 2002 Treasury report, the agency combines
these data “with other governmental and commercial information from a
variety of data sources” and “link[s to] a variety of databases,” to operate
“one of the largest repositories of financial information available to law en-
forcement in the country.”54 State and local law enforcement “in every
state” as well as federal law enforcement officials have online access to this
information.55
The USA PATRIOT Act also mandates new rules requiring all financial
institutions to: (1) verify the identity of any person seeking to open an ac-
count; (2) maintain records of the information used to verify the person’s
identity (e.g., a driver’s license or passport); and (3) provide the information
to the government for matching with terrorist watch lists.56 This reporting
and recordkeeping requirement is much broader than it might first appear
because federal law defines “financial institutions” very broadly to include
entities that “significantly engage” in activities as diverse as appraising real
estate and personal property; leasing personal or real property; furnishing
general economic information or statistical forecasting services; providing
finance-related educational courses or instructional materials; providing tax-
planning and tax-preparation services; providing ancillary services in or
through a bank (such as notary public services, selling postage stamps or bus
tickets, or providing vehicle registration services); and support services for
any of these activities, including courier and data processing services.57
b. Aviation and Transportation Security
The Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) has struggled
with how to screen airline and other passengers to determine whether they
are on government terrorist watch lists or otherwise present a threat to avia-
tion security. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)
has required airlines to deny boarding or give “enhanced screening” to pas-
51 See id. at 6; See also 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).
52 See Suspicious Activity and Currency Transaction Reports: Balancing Law Enforcement
Utility and Regulatory Requirements: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tion of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 46 (2007) (statement of William F. Baity,
Deputy Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Treasury Dep’t).
53 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 25, at 9. R
54 Id.
55 See id. at 10.
56 See, e.g., Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit
Unions, and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,090 (June 9, 2003) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 21, 103, 208, 211, 326, 563, and 748).
57 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2007).
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sengers identified by the FAA.58 Furthermore, airlines for the past decade
have been required to use a computer assisted passenger pre-screening sys-
tem (“CAPPS”), which designated certain passengers as “Selectees” based
on “customized, FAA-approved criteria.”59 Selectees undergo additional
screening based on this crude form of subject- and pattern-based data min-
ing. TSA has experimented unsuccessfully with Computer Assisted Passen-
ger Pre-Screening System II (“CAPPS II”) that would have reviewed
passengers against both governmental and commercial databases to deter-
mine which of three levels of risk they posed.60 This far more ambitious data
mining was derailed by public and congressional controversy over privacy
issues.61
DHS has published a notice of proposed rulemaking for “Secure
Flight,” a program that will require airlines to request each passenger’s full
name, gender, and birth date, and submit those data, along with the reserva-
tion record locator and other itinerary information,62 to the TSA for matching
against terrorist watch lists.63 Passengers would only be required to provide
their full name at the time of reservation to allow TSA to perform watch list
matching. However, if the absence of the other requested information meant
that the TSA had insufficient information to distinguish a passenger from a
person on the watch list, the individual could “experience delays, be subject
to additional screening, be denied transport, or be denied authorization to
enter a sterile area.”64 In short, the TSA is trying to use the consequences of
poor data matching to motivate passengers to provide more complete infor-
mation necessary for more accurate matching.
The Automated Targeting System (“ATS”) is designed to assess the
risk of passengers, vehicles, and cargo entering or leaving the United States.
Based on data from numerous sources, ATS compiles an assessment on the
risks presented by each person (passenger or crew member) seeking to enter,
exit, or transit through the United States by land, air, or sea; people who
engage in any form of trade or other commercial transaction related to the
importation or exportation of merchandise; and people who serve as booking
58 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The Aviation Secur-
ity System and the 9/11 Attacks, Staff Statement No. 3, at 6 (Jan. 27, 2004), available at http://
www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_3.pdf.
59 Id.
60 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-385, AVIATION SECURITY: COMPUTER-
ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHAL-
LENGES 6-7 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2008).
61 Mimi Hall & Barbara DeLollis, Plan to Collect Flier Data Cancelled, USA TODAY,
July 15, 2004, at 1A.
62 Itinerary information is the following information about a flight: (1) departure airport
code; (2) aircraft operator; (3) departure date; (4) departure time; (5) arrival date; (6) scheduled
arrival time; (7) arrival airport code; (8) flight number; (9) operating carrier (if available).
Secure Flight Program, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,356 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.
1540, 1544, and 1560).
63 See id.
64 Id.
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agents, brokers, or who otherwise provide information on behalf of persons
seeking to enter, exit, or transit through the United States.65 This same infor-
mation must be provided to Customs and Border Protection under the “Ad-
vance Passenger Information System” electronic data system.66 These data
are retained by the government for fifteen years under an agreement with the
European Commission.67
c. SWIFT Subpoenas
Another prominent example of data mining conducted by the U.S. gov-
ernment involves disclosures of data about international bank transfers. The
Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunication
(“SWIFT”) is a cooperative of financial institutions established under Bel-
gian law in 197368 that supplies secure, standardized messaging services to
more than 8,100 financial institutions in 208 countries.69 While it is neither a
payment system nor a settlement system, it transfers more than 13.4 million
messages a day about international financial transactions.70
Beginning shortly after September 11, 2001, the Treasury Office of For-
eign Assets Control began issuing administrative subpoenas for the data held
in SWIFT’s U.S. operations center. As of December 2006, SWIFT had re-
ceived sixty-five subpoenas, each of which required it to provide the govern-
ment with data “relevant to terrorism investigations.”71 The Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control and SWIFT failed to make transparent the negoti-
ations regarding the release of the personal data, and neither SWIFT nor the
U.S. government has confirmed the total number of records involved.72
SWIFT maintains that it limited U.S. access to its full database.73 Under an
agreement reached in June 2007 between U.S. and European officials, per-
65 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000); U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion, Automated Targeting System, System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,650 (Aug. 6, 2007)
(DHS, system of records notice of clarification).
66 Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member Manifests for Com-
mercial Aircraft and Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
pts. 4 and 22).
67 See Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), June 23, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 204) 23, availa-
ble at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_204/l_20420070804en00180025.
pdf [hereinafter 2007 PNR Agreement].
68 See Soc’y for Worldwide Int’l Fin. Telecomm., SWIFT history, http://www.swift.com/
index.cfm?item_id=1243 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
69 See Soc’y for Worldwide Int’l Fin. Telecomm., SWIFT in Figures—SWIFTNet FIN
Traffic July 2007 YTD (2007), http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=63134 (last visited
Mar. 13, 2008).
70 Id.
71 JENNIFER STODDART, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CANADA, COMM’R’S FINDINGS
¶ 30 (2007), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/2007/swift_rep_070402_e.asp.
72 See BELGIAN DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF THE OPINION ON THE
TRANSFER OF PERSONAL DATA BY SCRL SWIFT FOLLOWING THE UST (OFAC) SUBPOENAS 1
(2006).
73 STODDART, supra note 71 at ¶ 34. R
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sonal data obtained from SWIFT will not be retained for longer than five
years.74
d. Terrorist Surveillance Program
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times revealed that the National
Security Agency (NSA) was intercepting communications where at least one
party was located inside the United States, without obtaining judicial author-
ization.75 In the face of the ensuing controversy, the President acknowledged
the existence of the surveillance program, which he and other administration
officials described as involving only communications into and out of the
United States where there is a “reasonable basis to conclude that one party
to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a
member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda.”76 In addition, the Ad-
ministration reported that surveillance activities were “reviewed approxi-
mately every 45 days” by the Attorney General to ensure they were being
conducted “properly.”77 Administration officials have described this pro-
gram as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” and have acknowledged that
it is only one of a “number of intelligence activities [that] were authorized
in one order.”78
The Administration has pursued and defended the Terrorist Surveillance
Program with more sustained vigor than any other publicly acknowledged
data mining program. It was the subject of the late-night visit to the hospital
bedside of Attorney General John Ashcroft by White House Chief of Staff
Andrew Card and then-Counsel Alberto Gonzalez in an effort to persuade
the ailing Attorney General to overrule his deputy and reauthorize the pro-
gram.79 It was also at the heart of a successful Administration lobbying effort
to persuade Congress to amend federal law to temporarily eliminate judicial
oversight of surveillance “directed at a person reasonably believed to be
located outside of the United States.”80
74 See James Risen, U.S. Reaches Tentative Deal with Europe on Bank Data, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2007, at A6.
75 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
76 Press Briefing, Alberto Gonzalez, Att’y Gen. & General Michael Hayden, Principal
Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html.
77 Press Conference, President George W. Bush (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LE-
GAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NAT’L SEC. AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE
PRESIDENT (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
78 Letter from J.M. McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Arlen Spec-
ter, Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee (July 31, 2007), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/NID_Specter073107.pdf.
79 See Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at 40.
80 Protect America Act of 2007, S. 1927, 110th Cong. § 105A (2007). See generally Joby
Warrick & Walter Pincus, How the Fight for Vast New Spying Powers Was Won, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 2007, at A1.
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e. Domestic Surveillance Program
One program that may be among the other “intelligence activities” au-
thorized by the President involves the installation by the NSA of sophisti-
cated surveillance equipment in domestic switching facilities operated by
AT&T and Verizon. According to class-action lawsuits brought by the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, the equipment was used to “intercept[ ] and dis-
clos[e] to the government the contents of its customers’ communications as
well as detailed communications records about millions of its customers.”81
USA Today reported in June 2006 that nineteen lawmakers who had been
briefed on the program “verified that the NSA has built a database that in-
cludes records of Americans’ domestic phone calls.”82 The data to which the
NSA program has access include records, such as “the numbers dialed and
the length of calls,”83 about “most telephone calls in the United States,”84
potentially “hundreds of billions of telephone calls each year.”85 This in-
cludes purely domestic communications.
Some telecommunications experts have asserted that the fiber optic
connections to the NSA equipment are too large and are connected to the
wrong part of the telephone network to be collecting only billing records.
For example, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, writing in the New
Yorker in May 2006, quoted an unnamed “security consultant” as saying
that the government had “direct access to the carrier’s network core—the
critical area of its system, where all of its data are stored. ‘What the compa-
nies are doing is worse than turning over records,’ the consultant said.
‘They’re providing total access to all the data.’” 86
f. Total Information Awareness
The most visible and controversial data mining initiative to date has
been the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) project
ironically named “Total Information Awareness” (“TIA”)—later renamed
“Terrorism Information Awareness.” TIA included technologies to search
personally identifiable transaction records and recognize patterns across sep-
arate databases for the purpose of combating terrorism.87 Speaking at the
DARPATech 2002 Conference, John Poindexter, retired Admiral and director
of DARPA’s Information Awareness Office (“IAO”), described the need to
81 Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 6, Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., No. C-06-0672-JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://www.eff.org/
files/filenode/att/att_complaint_amended.pdf.
82 Susan Page, Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at 2A.
83 Id.
84 Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Bush is Pressed over New Report on Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A1.
85 Barton Gellman & Arshad Mohammed, Data on Phone Calls Monitored, WASH. POST,
May 12, 2006, at A1.
86 Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2006, at 25.
87 See TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 15-20. R
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“become much more efficient and more clever in the ways we find new
sources of data, mine information from the new and old, generate informa-
tion, make it available for analysis, convert it to knowledge, and create ac-
tionable options.”88
Admiral Poindexter went on to identify “one of the significant new data
sources that needs to be mined to discover and track terrorists”—the “trans-
action space.”89 “If terrorist organizations are going to plan and execute at-
tacks against the United States, their people must engage in transactions and
they will leave signatures in this information space.”90 He then showed a
slide of categories of transaction data that included “Communications, Fi-
nancial, Education, Travel, Medical, Veterinary, Country Entry, Place/Event
Entry, Transportation, Housing, Critical Resources, and Government”
records.91
According to a subsequent DARPA report, “Red Teams” would:
[I]magine the types of terrorist attacks that might be carried out
against the United States at home or abroad. They would develop
scenarios for these attacks and determine what kind of planning
and preparation activities would have to be carried out in order to
conduct these attacks. . . . The red team would determine the types
of transactions that would have to be carried out to perform these
activities. . . . These transactions would form a pattern that may be
discernable in certain databases to which the U.S. Government
would have lawful access.92
This is the classic statement of pattern-based data mining: develop pat-
terns of the targeted behavior and then search across databases to detect
those patterns. But the DARPA assurance that the subsequent searches would
be performed only on databases to which the government had “lawful ac-
cess” did little to quell mounting opposition to the program, since the gov-
ernment has lawful access to virtually all private-sector databases.
On January 23, 2003, in response to a storm of protest about TIA’s
potential impact on privacy ignited by a column by William Safire,93 the
Senate adopted an amendment to the Omnibus Appropriations Act that pro-
hibited deployment of TIA in connection with data about U.S. persons with-
88 John Poindexter, Director, Info. Awareness Office, Overview of the Info. Awareness
Office, Prepared Remarks for Delivery at DARPATech 2002 Conference (Aug. 2, 2002), at 1,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html.
89 Id. at 2.
90 Id.
91 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 15. R
92 INFO. AWARENESS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE
TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM 15 (2003), available at http://usacm.acm.org/
usacm/PDF/TIA_May_20_2003_report.pdf.
93 William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35.
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out specific congressional authorization.94 Eight months later, Congress
terminated funding for TIA, with the exception of “[p]rocessing, analysis,
and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence” specified
in a classified annex to the Act.95 This reference to the classified annex sug-
gested that maybe research on data mining had merely been moved out of
sight. According to press reports, the new home for the TIA successor is the
Disruptive Technology Office under the Director of National Intelligence.96
C. Summary
These are just a sample of the disclosed government programs that col-
lect and use personal data for data mining. They almost all have in common
their reliance, in whole or in part, on data supplied—in most cases through
some compulsory process—by the private sector. Most are part of some es-
sential government service, whether administering social services, collecting
revenue, enforcing the law, or protecting national security. It is in these latter
two areas that we have seen the greatest growth in government data mining
over the past seven years, the greatest reliance on third-party data, and the
most heated controversy.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY:
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Historically, the primary constitutional limit on the government’s ability
to obtain personal information about individuals is the Fourth Amendment,
which reflects the Framers’ hostility to “general searches”—searches not
based on specific suspicion.97 Since such searches are at the heart of most
government data mining programs, which involve collecting and analyzing
vast swaths of data about individuals who have done nothing to warrant the
government’s suspicion, this section examines the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment and its application to data obtained from
third parties.
A. Framework
The Fourth Amendment does not purport to keep the government from
conducting searches or seizing personal information. It only prohibits “un-
reasonable” searches and seizures but is silent about what makes a search or
94 See S. Amend. 59 to H.R.J. Res. 2, 108th Cong. (Jan. 23, 2003); see Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution of 2003, 10 U.S.C. § 2241 (Supp. III 2003).
95 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131, 117
Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-283 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (“The conferees
are concerned about the activities of the Information Awareness Office and direct that the
Office be terminated immediately.”).
96 See Shane Harris, TIA Lives On, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2006.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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seizure “unreasonable.” In his 1967 concurrence in Katz v. United States,
Justice Harlan wrote that reasonableness was defined by both the individual’s
“actual,” subjective expectation of privacy and by an objective expectation
that was “one that society was prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 98 The
Court adopted that test for determining what was “private” within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment in 1968 and continues to apply it today.99
The Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment also to require
that certain searches be conducted only with a warrant issued by a court,
even though this is not a requirement contained in the amendment itself.100
For a court to issue a warrant, the government must show “probable cause”
that a crime has been or is likely to be committed and that the information
sought is germane to that crime.101 The Supreme Court also generally re-
quires that the government provide the subject of a search with contempora-
neous notice of the search.102
The Fourth Amendment applies to searches and surveillance conducted
for domestic law enforcement purposes within the United States and those
conducted outside of the United States if they involve U.S. citizens (al-
though not necessarily permanent resident aliens).103 The Fourth Amendment
also applies to searches and surveillance conducted for national security and
intelligence purposes within the United States if they involve U.S. persons
(i.e., U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens) who do not have a connec-
tion to a foreign power.104 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and surveillance for national se-
curity and intelligence purposes that involve U.S. persons who are connected
to a foreign power or those that are conducted wholly outside of the United
States.105
Where it does apply, the Fourth Amendment’s protection, while consid-
erable, is not absolute. The Supreme Court has determined, for example, that
warrants are not required to search or seize items in the “plain view” of a
law enforcement officer,106 for searches that are conducted incidental to valid
arrests,107 or for searches specially authorized by the Attorney General or the
98 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
99 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
100 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-4 (1997).
101 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 166 (1993).
102 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
103 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
104 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
105 See Jeffrey H. Smith & Elizabeth L. Howe, Federal Legal Constraints on Electronic
Surveillance, in PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A REPORT OF
THE MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE 133 (2002). Lower courts have found, however, that
there is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for searches conducted
for intelligence purposes within the United States that involve only non-U.S. persons or agents
of foreign powers. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
106 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
107 See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
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President involving foreign threats of “immediate and grave peril” to na-
tional security.108
Moreover, the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment to ap-
ply only to the collection of information, not the use of it. Even if informa-
tion is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has consistently found that the Fourth Amendment imposes no independent
duty on the government to refrain from using it: “The Fourth Amendment
contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in
violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure
‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’” 109 Under the Court’s “exclu-
sionary rule,” illegally seized data may still be used if the government agent
acted in good faith,110 to impeach a witness,111 or in other settings in which
the “officer committing the unconstitutional search or seizure” has “no re-
sponsibility or duty to, or agreement with, the sovereign seeking to use the
evidence.”112 The Court suppresses the use of information obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment only when doing so would have deterred the
conduct of the government employee who acted unconstitutionally when
collecting the information. So, for example, the Court has allowed records
illegally seized by criminal investigators to be used by tax investigators on
the basis that restricting the subsequent use would not deter the original un-
constitutional conduct.113 Protecting privacy is not a consideration. The
Court wrote in 1974 that the exclusionary rule operates as “a judicially cre-
ated remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved.”114 If a court finds no independent Fourth Amendment basis
for restricting the use of illegally obtained information, it goes without say-
ing that the Court does not apply the Fourth Amendment to restrict the use of
lawfully obtained information. Thus, the Fourth Amendment today sets no
limit on the government’s use of lawfully seized records, and in the case of
unlawfully seized material, restricts its use only to the extent necessary to
provide a deterrent for future illegal conduct.
108 Smith & Howe, supra note 105, at 136 n.16; see 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures R
§§ 161, 347, 353 (1993).
109 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
110 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-28.
111 See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
112 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (1975).
113 Id.
114 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
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B. The Miller Exclusion of Third-Party Records
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Miller115 that there
can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in information held by a third
party. The case involved cancelled checks, to which, the Court noted, “re-
spondent can assert neither ownership nor possession.”116 Such documents
“contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business.”117 Therefore, the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the government
sought access to them:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Govern-
ment. This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.118
The Court’s decision in Miller is remarkably sweeping. The bank did
not just happen to be holding the records the government sought. Instead, the
Bank Secrecy Act required (and continues to require) banks to maintain a
copy of every customer check and deposit for six years or longer.119 The
government thus compelled the bank to store the information, and then
sought the information from the bank on the basis that since the bank held
the data, there could not be any reasonable expectation of privacy, and the
Fourth Amendment therefore did not apply.120 A majority of the Supreme
Court was not troubled by this end run around the Fourth Amendment:
“even if the banks could be said to have been acting solely as Government
agents in transcribing the necessary information and complying without pro-
test with the requirements of the subpoenas, there would be no intrusion
upon the depositors’ Fourth Amendment rights.”121
Congress reacted to the decision by enacting modest statutory protec-
tion for customer financial records held by financial institutions,122 but there
is no constitutional protection for financial records or any other personal
information that has been disclosed to third parties. As a result, the govern-
115 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
116 Id. at 440.
117 Id. at 442.
118 Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
119 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(d), 1829b(g) (2000); see Miller, 425 U.S. at 436; Cal. Bankers
Ass’n v. Shulz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
120 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
121 Id. at 444.
122 Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000); see infra text accom-
panying notes 146-153. R
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ment can collect even the most sensitive information from a third party with-
out a warrant and without risk that the search may be found unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court reinforced its holding in Miller in the 1979 case Smith v.
Maryland, involving information about (as opposed to the content of) tele-
phone calls.123 The Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment inapplicable
to telecommunications attributes (e.g., the number dialed, the time the call
was placed, the duration of the call, etc.), because that information is neces-
sarily conveyed to, or observable by, third parties involved in connecting the
call.124 “Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey nu-
merical information to the phone company; that the phone company has fa-
cilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in
fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.”125
As a result, under the Fourth Amendment, the use of “pen registers” (to
record out-going call information) and “trap and trace” devices (to record
in-coming call information) does not require a warrant because the devices
only collect information about the call that is necessarily disclosed to
others.126 As with information disclosed to financial institutions, Congress
reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision by creating modest statutory re-
quirements applicable to pen registers,127 but the Constitution does not apply.
C. The Miller Exclusion of Third-Party Records Today
The third-party exemption from the Fourth Amendment made little
sense in the two cases in which it was created. Individuals who write checks
and place telephone calls do not “voluntarily” convey information to third
parties. They have no choice but to convey the information if they wish to
use what in the 1970s were the overwhelmingly dominant means of making
large-value payments and communicating over physical distances. Moreo-
ver, banks and telephone companies collect and store data not only because
of business necessity, but also because the law requires them to. The infor-
mation collected and stored by banks and telephone companies is subject to
explicit or implicit promises that it will not be further disclosed. Most cus-
tomers would be astonished to find their checks or telephone billing records
printed in the newspaper. As a result of those promises and individuals’ gen-
eral expectations of privacy, the assumption that such information would be
private was objectively reasonable and widely shared. The Court’s decisions
to the contrary, while serving important law enforcement objectives, made
little logical or practical sense and did not reflect the expectations of either
123 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
124 Id. at 733-34, 745-46.
125 Id. at 743.
126 Id. at 742.
127 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also infra text accompanying notes 154- R
156. R
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the public or policymakers, as demonstrated by the fact that Congress re-
sponded so quickly to both decisions with gap-filling legislation.
Irrespective of whether Miller and Smith were correctly decided, how-
ever, excluding records held by third parties from the protection of the
Fourth Amendment makes no sense today because of the extraordinary in-
crease in both the volume and sensitivity of information about individuals
necessarily held by third parties. Professor Daniel Solove writes, “[w]e are
becoming a society of records, and these records are not held by us, but by
third parties.”128 Thanks to the proliferation of digital technologies and net-
works such as the Internet, and tremendous advances in the capacity of stor-
age devices and parallel decreases in their cost and physical size, those
records are linked and shared more widely and stored far longer than ever
before, often without the individual consumer’s knowledge or consent.129
This is especially true as more activities move online, where merchants re-
cord data not only on what we buy and how we pay for our purchases, but
also on every detail of what we look at, what we search for, how we navigate
through web sites, and with whom we communicate.
These records are not only found in the Internet context. Computers
track every moment of most employees’ days. Digital time clocks and entry
key cards record physical movements. Computers store work product, e-
mail, and voice mail. Sensors monitor productivity—from check-out scan-
ners at retail points-of-sale, which record how quickly cashiers process
transactions, to key cards that monitor how long employees spend in the
bathroom or break room each day. Digital devices for paying tolls, computer
diagnostic equipment in car engines, and global positioning services—that
are increasingly common on passenger vehicles—record how many miles
we drive. Cellular telephones and personal digital assistants record not only
call and appointment information, but location as well, and the devices trans-
mit this information to service providers. Digital cable and satellite service
providers record what we watch and when. Alarm systems record when we
enter and leave our homes. ATMs and digital credit and debit card terminals
record who and where we are, what we buy or how much money we with-
draw, and where we bank.
Indications are that this is just the beginning. Broadband Internet access
in homes has not only increased the personal activities in which we now
engage online, but also created new and successful markets for remote com-
puter back-up and online photo, e-mail, and music storage services. With
128 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2002).
129 See id.; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRI-
VACY IN AMERICA (2001); James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and Na-
tional Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002);
Derek J. Somogy, Information Brokers and Privacy, 2 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 901
(2006).
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Voice Over IP telephone service, digital phone calls are becoming indistin-
guishable from digital documents: both can be stored and accessed remotely.
Moreover, these technologies generate digital records that are available
to many parties. For example, in a credit or debit card transaction, the data
are collected by the retailer, the transaction processor, the card issuer, the
cardholder’s bank, and the merchant’s bank.130 Digital networks have also
facilitated the growth of vigorous outsourcing markets, so information pro-
vided to one company is increasingly likely to be processed by a separate
institution. Records containing personal data are linked and shared more
widely and stored far longer than ever before, often without the individual
consumer’s knowledge or consent.
There are information aggregation businesses in the private sector that
already combine personal data from thousands of private-sector sources and
public records. ChoicePoint, Acxiom, LexisNexis, the three national credit
bureaus, and dozens of other companies maintain rich repositories of infor-
mation about virtually every adult in the country. These records are updated
daily by a steady stream of incoming data. They provide a one-stop-shop for
the government when it wants access to personal data, and most of the gov-
ernment’s data mining initiatives depend on access to those data.131
New surveillance technologies are supplementing this already rich store
of personal data and providing the government, primarily via the private
sector, with ready access to increasingly revealing information about
individuals:
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are small computer chips
used for tracking.132 They are injected today into pets (and on occa-
sion people) to facilitate identification and to provide medical or
other information.133 Tags are embedded in consumer goods to help
prevent shoplifting and fraudulent returns. Electronic toll payment
systems, such as EZ-Pass, I Pass, FastPass, and FasTrak, often rely on
130 See National Federation of Independent Business, How a Basic Credit Card Transac-
tion Works, http://www.nfib.com/object/2730732.html (June 6, 2003).
131 See generally Personal Information: Agencies and Resellers Vary in Providing Privacy
Protections: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law and the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Linda D. Koontz, Director of Info. Mgmt. Issues, Gov’t Accountability Office); Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Bro-
kers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
595 (2004).
132 RFID tags contain limited information, usually a unique identification number. A
reader or scanner in the vicinity of a tag can read the information it contains. Passive tags can
be almost microscopic and require close proximity to read. Active tags might be the size of a
quarter, and can be read from several hundred feet. The data in the tag is often linked to a
database, which provides additional information.
133 In January 2008, the British government proposed inserting RFID tags under the skin
of prisoners to make them easier to track. See Brian Brady, Prisoners ‘To Be Chipped Like
Dogs’, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/polit-
ics/prisoners-to-be-chipped-like-dogs-769977.html.
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RFID tags, and they are also found in U.S. passports, I-94 forms, and
high-denomination Euro notes.
• Global Positioning System (“GPS”) takes advantage of medium-or-
bit satellites to provide precise information about the location, speed,
and direction of movement of a person or object, as well as the time.
GPS is also routinely used in automobile navigational systems.
Under federal law, all cell phones must now provide the cell phone
service provider with precise information about the location of each
cell phone.134 This is designed to facilitate the dispatch of emergency
services to a caller’s location, but it also allows the government and
other third parties to obtain location information on cell phone
users.135
• Other location sensors are also used to determine an individual’s lo-
cation. For example, a laptop, PDA, or cell phone that connects to a
Wireless Local Area Network necessarily provides information con-
cerning the user’s location. Similarly, cell phones that are not
equipped with GPS can be located by “triangulating” the compara-
tive strength with which the cell phone signal is received by three or
more cell towers. It is difficult to imagine why government officials
would ever resort to a “beeper” or physical surveillance when they
can track the movement of a suspect through any number of other
methods—such as GPS devices in her car or cell phone and RFID
tags in her clothing, wallet, and car—accessible through the private
sector.
• Digital audio and video have introduced significant new surveillance
capabilities. Digital cameras offer ultra-high resolution images capa-
ble of identifying faces and license plate numbers from hundreds of
feet away. They are increasingly wireless and are so small that they
can be contained in a shirt button. Moreover, they are digital, which
makes the data they collect easier and cheaper to store and share, and
conducive to analysis with sophisticated voice, face, and threat rec-
ognition programs. Face recognition technologies that compare video
images with databases of targeted individuals were used at the Super
Bowl in Tampa, Florida, in 2001, and by numerous other authorities
since then.136
134 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000).
135 In August 2007, New York City Public Schools terminated an employee because the
location information generated by his employer-provided cell phone showed he was not at
work when he claimed to be. See David Seifman, ‘Track’ Man Is Sacked—GPS Nails Ed. Guy,
N.Y. POST, Aug. 31, 2007, at 27. Trucking lines, rental car companies, and other businesses
now routinely rely on GPS to locate their vehicles. See Anita Ramasastry, Tracking Every
Move You Make, FINDLAW, Aug. 23, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20050823.
html.
136 See U.S. Urged to Regulate Face-Scan Technology, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 9,
2001, at A5. The San Francisco International Airport has deployed software to monitor images
from its surveillance cameras and automatically classify objects and behaviors as “suspi-
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• Biometric identification relies on behavioral and physiological char-
acteristics of humans to verify identity and authorization to access
protected facilities, funds, or data.137 Modern security systems are in-
creasingly relying on new biometric identification characteristics, for
example, fingerprints. Many computers today come equipped with
fingerprint scanners, and large organizations are increasingly moving
to fingerprints to help verify identity (visitors to Disney World must
now provide a fingerprint in an effort to prevent sharing of tickets).138
Iris, retina, and voice recognition are also used in some settings today
(the Clear Registered Traveler Program uses the distinct pattern of
the individual’s iris to verify identity).139
• High resolution photography has become an increasingly common
way to collect personal data. Long a technique of national security
agencies, high resolution satellite photography is used today by many
businesses and available to individual users via internet services such
as Google Earth, which provides high-resolution images of popular
locations so that objects as small as six inches are recognizable, and
Google Street View, which provides professional on-the ground
images of major cities. Of course, not all surveillance technology has
to be high-resolution. The cameras now universally included in cell
phones form perhaps the largest sensor network in the world, espe-
cially as users increasingly post their pictures online and services
such as Google Image Search make them easily accessible.
These are only a few of the most widely used surveillance technologies
that add to the store of personal data that are available to the government via
the private sector. These technologies are in addition to the “routine” data
collection techniques that private- and public-sector institutions use every
day as individuals work, play, shop, travel, invest, study, and communicate,
and comply with the numerous government reporting requirements that at-
tach to these activities. The Miller exclusion of information disclosed to
third parties from the Fourth Amendment means that the government can
access all of this information without constitutional limit, no matter how
cious,” as part of a $30-million pilot program funded by the federal government. MARK
SCHLOSBERG & NICOLE A. OZER, UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYE: THE PROLIFERATION OF VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA  4 (2007), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/
criminal_justice/police_practices/Under_the_Watchful_Eye_The_Proliferation_of_Video_Sur-
veillance_Systems_in_California.pdf. Law enforcement officials are also experimenting with a
new technology that can “pick up aggressive tones on the basis of 12 factors including decibel
level, pitch, and the speed at which words are spoken,” via microphones from as far as 100
yards away. Word on the Street . . . They’re Listening, SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, at 1.
137 Handwriting analysis (e.g., matching signatures) is a longstanding use of behavioral
biometric identification; passport and driver’s license photographs are common examples of
physiological biometric identification.
138 See Talk of the Nation, High-Tech Spy Tools Aren’t Just for James Bond (NPR radio
broadcast Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
12594656 (follow “Listen Now” hyperlink).
139 See Rob Schneider, Fly by Those Lines: System Letting Registered Air Travelers Get
Through Security Faster Takes Off, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 19, 2007, at 1.
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sensitive or how revealing of a person’s health, finances, tastes, or convic-
tions. The government’s demand need not be reasonable; no warrant is nec-
essary, and no judicial authorization or oversight is required.
D. Reversing Miller?
One response to the explosion in digital information that has trans-
formed Miller into a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment would be for
the Supreme Court to overturn the case. The Court could accomplish this
simply by applying its current test for reasonableness to recognize that indi-
viduals do not, in fact, believe that information they provide in the course of
ordinary activities is automatically available to the government and that their
belief is “one that society was prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 140
Alternatively, the Court could announce a new test for evaluating when war-
rants are required for the government to seize personal information held by
third parties or could require that the government always obtain judicial au-
thorization before accessing such records.
As important and desirable as such a judicial development would be
from a civil-liberties perspective, it is highly unlikely. The Court has shown
little willingness to extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment in any
fashion, especially in response to new technologies. In only a handful of
cases in the past twenty years has the Court responded positively to a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the use of a new technology to capture informa-
tion—and those cases involved intrusions into the home.141 In fact, with the
sole exception of physical searches inside the home, the Court has proven
more likely to reduce, rather than preserve (much less expand), Fourth
Amendment protections. The recent additions to the Court’s membership
seem unlikely to reverse this trend.
Nonetheless, even if the Supreme Court unexpectedly reversed or nar-
rowed its third-party doctrine, that would still be inadequate to address the
range of issues presented by the government’s use of third-party records for
data mining. For example, there would still be a need to address the Court’s
historical unwillingness to apply the Fourth Amendment or other constitu-
tional provisions to restrict the use or sharing of personal information ob-
tained by the government, even when it has been illegally seized.142 Many
government data-mining programs involve data that were collected either
directly from the individual or from a third party for a regulatory or adminis-
trative purpose. Extending the Fourth Amendment to restrict the reuse of
these data would require a fundamental shift in the Court’s jurisprudence.
For more than thirty years the Court has focused its Fourth Amendment ju-
140 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
141 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (involving the use of a thermal
imager to sense activities within a home); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (involv-
ing the use of a beeper that tracked the defendant’s movement inside his home).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1975).
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risprudence concerning illegally obtained material exclusively on deterring
illegal collection of data, rather than preventing subsequent use or protecting
personal privacy.143
In addition, the abandonment or weakening of the Court’s third-party
doctrine would require the creation of new rules or principles to guide lower
courts in deciding what conditions would justify granting warrants for seiz-
ing third-party records, how to deal with requests for entire data sets rather
than targeted data, and how to reconcile the potential need for the govern-
ment to obtain judicial authorization to seize data with the fact that in many
cases data are available for purchase from the third party or an information
aggregator. These and other fundamental policy issues are better addressed
by Congress. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment could provide, at best, only
broad limits on government data mining. While those limits are important,
and their absence denies individual privacy its most potent protection, gov-
ernment officials require clearer guidance concerning the appropriate con-
duct of data mining. Given how unlikely it is that the Court will abandon its
third-party doctrine in the first place, Congress is the only meaningful place
for citizens and government officials to turn for modern, coherent rules for
how data mining is to be conducted and privacy protected.
IV. STATUTORY RESPONSES
The Supreme Court’s decision to exempt third-party records from the
protection of the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily mean that those
records are freely available to the government. Congress has adopted a num-
ber of statutes—two in response to the Supreme Court’s third-party doc-
trine—in an effort to provide some protection for the privacy of personal
information.  Congress’s role is potentially vital because of the breadth of its
power and its ability to provide detailed, prospective guidance to the public
and to government officials about the government’s access to personal
information.
Unfortunately, while Congress’s privacy enactments may be numerous,
they provide only modest protection, limited to specific economic sectors
and subject to broad exceptions.  The result is a remarkably complex set of
laws, yielding very limited protection for privacy and little clear guidance to
government agencies or private-sector entities.  Recent “privacy” laws have
further complicated the situation by actually weakening the limits on gov-
ernment access to personal data held by third parties.
Finally, despite the proliferation of government data mining programs,
Congress has enacted no legislation to provide a legal framework for how
such programs are to be undertaken, to provide redress for innocent people
harmed by them, or to specify how privacy is to be protected in the process.
This is not to say that Congress has been silent on the subject of data mining.
143 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
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Indeed, Congress has simultaneously been an enthusiastic proponent and an
active critic. For example, Congress directed the DHS to “establish and util-
ize . . . data-mining and other advanced analytical tools . . . to access, re-
ceive, and analyze data” in order to “detect and identify threats of terrorism
against the United States,”144 but then it acted to terminate specific data min-
ing initiatives when confronted with them.145
A. The Response to Miller and Smith
Congress responded to United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland
with specific statutes designed to address the vacuum created by the Su-
preme Court’s decisions. The Right to Financial Privacy Act, enacted in
1978, two years after Miller, regulates how federal agencies may obtain fi-
nancial records from financial institutions.146 The statute provides substan-
tially less protection than would have been required under the Fourth
Amendment and is subject to a number of exceptions. The Act provides that
federal agencies may not access the financial records of customers of finan-
cial institutions without the customer’s consent, an administrative subpoena,
a search warrant, a judicial subpoena, or a “formal written request.”147 This
is less protection than would be required under the Fourth Amendment, be-
cause administrative and judicial subpoenas can be issued without any show-
ing of probable cause and often without any showing of suspicion regarding
a particular matter.148 For example, the Act specifies that subpoenas and for-
mal written requests may issue upon the mere showing that “there is a rea-
son to believe that the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry.”149
In addition, the statute is subject to a number of exceptions, including
disclosures required under any other federal statute or rule.150 The Act does
not restrict a financial institution from notifying federal authorities that it
possesses information they should seek.151 And while the Act requires con-
temporaneous notice to the customer, it allows for that notice to be delayed
in a variety of circumstances.152 Most importantly, the Act does not apply
when the federal government obtains financial information from third parties
144 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 201(d)(1), (d)(14), 116 Stat.
2135, 2146-47 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 121 (Supp. V 2005)).
145 See S. Amend. 59 to H.R.J. Res. 2, 108th Cong. (Jan. 23, 2003); see also supra notes
94-95 and accompanying text. R
146 Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
147 Id. § 3402.
148 See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 857-59 (2000).
149 12 U.S.C. §§ 3405(1), 3407(1), 3408(3) (2000).
150 See id. § 3413(d).
151 See id. § 3403(c).
152 See id. § 3409.
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other than financial institutions nor does it restrict disclosures to state or
local governments or to private entities.153
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, enacted seven
years after Smith, broadly regulates electronic surveillance.154 Title III—the
Pen Register Act—applies to “pen registers” and “trap and trace” de-
vices.155 To obtain information similar to what is contained in a phone bill or
revealed by Caller ID, or to capture e-mail header information (the “To,”
“From,” “Re,” and “Date” lines in an e-mail), or the IP address of a site
visited on the Internet, the government need only obtain a court order.
Courts, however, are required to issue the orders—there is no room for judi-
cial discretion—if the government certifies that “the information likely to be
obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal in-
vestigation.”156 As a result, Title III poses no meaningful barrier to the gov-
ernment’s use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. Moreover, the Act
provides for no exclusionary rule for violations of Title III, so law enforce-
ment may freely violate these provisions and still use the data in subsequent
criminal prosecutions.
Title II—the Stored Communications Act—also adopted in 1986, deals
with communications in electronic storage, such as e-mail and voice mail.157
Traditional warrants are required to obtain access to communications stored
180 days or less.158 To obtain material stored for more than 180 days, the
government need only provide an administrative subpoena, a grand jury sub-
poena, a trial subpoena, or a court order, all of which are easier to obtain
than a traditional warrant.159 Information about a customer’s account main-
tained by a communications provider can be obtained by the government
merely by providing “specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information
sought[ ] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”160
Violations carry a minimum fine of $1,000 but no exclusionary rule
applies.161
The weakness of the protections afforded by Titles II and III of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act are illustrated by a comparison with
the protection provided by Title I—the Wiretap Act—which was originally
adopted in 1968 and deals with the interception of the contents of communi-
153 See id. §§ 3401(1)-(3).
154 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
155 Pen Register Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 1868-72 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000)).
156 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
157 Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1860-68 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711).
158 See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1264, 1283-84 (2004).
159 See id.
160 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2000).
161 Solove, supra note 158, at 1285. R
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cations in transmission.162 It applies to “wire communications,” although not
to video unaccompanied by sound.163 To intercept wire communications in
transit requires a “‘super’ search warrant,”164 which can only be sought by
designated federal officials and requires probable cause, details about the
communication to be intercepted, minimization of any non-relevant commu-
nications inadvertently intercepted, and termination immediately upon com-
pletion.165 Information obtained in violation of these requirements can
subject the responsible agent to minimum damages of $10,000 per violation
and (except for e-mail) is subject to the exclusionary rule so that it cannot be
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.166
Despite their weaknesses, both the Financial Right to Privacy Act and
Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act do impose some lim-
its on the government’s power to seize financial and calling attribute infor-
mation. More importantly, they impose some discipline on the government
by specifying procedures to be followed. But they are a far cry from the
protection against “unreasonable” searches and seizures that the Fourth
Amendment would provide.
B. The Privacy Act
The broadest federal privacy law, and Congress’s earliest effort to regu-
late how the government collects and uses personal information, is the
Privacy Act of 1974.167 In the early 1970s, mounting concerns about comput-
erized databases prompted the government to examine the issues they
raised—technological and legal—by appointing an Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems in the then-Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW). In 1973, the Advisory Committee issued its report,
Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens.168 Congress responded the
following year with the Privacy Act.
The Privacy Act requires federal agencies to: (1) store only relevant and
necessary personal information and only for purposes required to be accom-
plished by statute or executive order; (2) collect information to the extent
possible from the data subject; (3) maintain records that are accurate, com-
plete, timely, and relevant; and (4) establish administrative, physical, and
162 See Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
163 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000).
164 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2003).
165 See Solove, supra note 158, at 1282. R
166 See id.
167 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
168 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTER, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
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technical safeguards to protect the security of records.169 The Privacy Act
also prohibits disclosure, even to other government agencies, of personally
identifiable information in any record contained in a “system of records,”
except pursuant to a written request by or with the written consent of the
data subject, or pursuant to a specific exception.170 Agencies must log disclo-
sures of records and, in some cases, inform the subjects of such disclosures
when they occur.171 Under the Act, data subjects must be able to access and
copy their records, each agency must establish a procedure for amendment
of records, and refusals by agencies to amend their records are subject to
judicial review.172 Agencies must also publish a notice of the existence, char-
acter, and accessibility of their record systems.173 Finally, individuals may
seek legal redress if an agency violates the Act with regard to data concern-
ing them.174
The Privacy Act is less protective of privacy than may first appear be-
cause of numerous broad exceptions.175 Twelve of these are expressly pro-
vided for in the Act itself. For example, information contained in an agency’s
records can be disclosed for “civil or criminal law enforcement activity if
the activity is authorized by law.”176 An agency can disclose its records to
officers and employees within the agency itself, the Bureau of the Census,
the National Archives, Congress, the Comptroller General, and consumer
reporting agencies.177 The Privacy Act also exempts information subject to
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.178 And under the “routine
use” exemption,179 federal agencies may disclose personal information so
long as the nature and scope of the routine use was previously published in
the Federal Register and the disclosure of data was “for a purpose which is
compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.”180 According to the
Office of Management and Budget, “compatibility” covers uses that are ei-
ther (1) functionally equivalent or (2) necessary and proper.181
169 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
170 Id. § 552a(b).
171 Id. §§ 552a(c), 552a(e)(8).
172 Id. §§ 552a(d), 552a(f)(4), 552a(g).
173 Id. § 552a(e)(4).
174 Id. § 552a(g)(1).
175 See Sean Fogarty & Daniel R. Ortiz, Limitations Upon Interagency Information Shar-
ing: The Privacy Act of 1974, in PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE,
supra note 105, at 127, 128. R
176 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7).
177 Id. § 552a(b).
178 Id. § 552a(b)(2).
179 Id. § 552a(b)(3).
180 Id. § 552a(a)(7).
181 Privacy Act of 1974; Guidance on the Privacy Act Implications of “Call Detail” Pro-
grams to Manage Employees’ Use of the Government’s Telecommunications Systems, 52 Fed.
Reg. 12,990, 12,993 (Apr. 20, 1987) (publication of guidance in final form); see generally
Fogarty & Ortiz, supra note 175, at 129-130. R
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Moreover, the Privacy Act applies only to information maintained in a
“system of records.”182 The Act defines “system of records” as a “group of
any records under the control of any agency from which information is re-
trieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, sym-
bol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”183 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that “retrieval
capability is not sufficient to create a system of records . . . . ‘To be in a
system of records, a record must . . . in practice [be] retrieved by an individ-
ual’s name or other personal identifier.’” 184 This is unlikely to be the case
with new data mining programs. They are more likely to involve searches
for people who fit within certain patterns, rather than inquiries by name or
other personal identifier.
As a result, the Privacy Act does little to provide guidance for govern-
ment data mining activities or to limit the government’s power to collect
personal data from third parties. In fact, the framework created by the Pri-
vacy Act, which was designed more than thirty years ago primarily for per-
sonnel records and benefits files, appears increasingly ill-suited for
regulating twenty-first century data mining.
C. The Response to Data Mining
Congress has enacted one law specifically targeting early data mining.
In 1988, Congress passed the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Act as an amendment to the Privacy Act.185 The new law responded to both
the growth in early forms of data mining within the federal government and
perceived inadequacies within existing privacy law to respond to data min-
ing. In particular, the Act was an effort to fill the gap created by the view of
agency officials, the Office of Management and Budget, and even courts that
data matching constituted a “routine use” of data and therefore was exempt
from the Privacy Act.186
The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act provides a series
of procedural requirements, such as written agreements between agencies
that share data for matching,187 before an agency can disclose personal infor-
mation for data mining. These requirements deal only with federal agencies
supplying—not obtaining—records for data mining.188 Moreover, they only
apply to data mining for the purpose of “establishing or verifying the eligi-
182 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
183 Id. § 552a(a)(5).
184 Henke v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting
Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403, 1408 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
185 Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(8),
552a(o)-(r) (2000)).
186 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY 57 (1986).
187 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o).
188 See id. § 552a(o)(1).
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bility of, or continuing compliance with statutory and regulatory require-
ments by, applicants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or
providers of service with respect to, cash or in-kind assistance or payments
under Federal benefit programs;” “recouping payment or delinquent debts
under such Federal benefit programs;” or “Federal personnel or payroll sys-
tems of records.”189 Law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and many other
purposes for which the government engages in data mining do not fit within
the definition of activities covered by the statute. Moreover, the Act specifi-
cally excludes data mining for “law enforcement,” “foreign counterintel-
ligence,” and “background checks.”190
D. Sectoral Privacy Laws
The 1988 law was effectively Congress’s last word on data mining.
Laws and regulations enacted since then have either ignored government
data mining entirely or failed to provide any structure for when data mining
is appropriate, how it should be conducted, and/or how privacy is to be pro-
tected. Furthermore, even so-called “privacy” laws have actually weakened
the protections against government seizure of personal data held by third
parties. For example, the Cable Act of 1984 prohibits cable companies from
providing the government with personally identifiable information about
their customers unless the government presents a court order.191 The USA
PATRIOT Act, adopted in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 at-
tacks, amended this provision to apply only to records about cable television
service and not other services—such as internet or telephone—that a cable
operator might provide.192
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, enacted in 1970, permits disclosure of
credit information only for statutorily specified purposes.193 One of those
purposes is “in response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue
such an order, or a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a
Federal grand jury.”194 In addition, consumer reporting agencies may freely
furnish identifying information (e.g., “name, address, former addresses,
places of employment, or former places of employment”) to the govern-
ment.195 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress amended the Act
to permit virtually unlimited disclosures to the government for counter-ter-
rorism purposes. All that is required is a “written certification” that the re-
189 Id. § 552a(a)(8)(A).
190 Id. §§ 552a(a)(8)(B)(iii), (B)(v)(vi).
191 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
192 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Title II, § 211,  Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
193 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b (West 2007).
194 Id. § 1681b(a)(1).
195 Id. § 1681f.
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quested information is “necessary for the agency’s conduct or such
investigation, activity or analysis.”196
In 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services adopted rules,
specifically authorized by Congress, protecting the privacy of personal
health information.197 While facially restrictive, in reality, those rules permit
broad disclosure of personal health information to the government in re-
sponse to a warrant, court order, subpoena, discovery request, administrative
request, investigative demand, or even a law enforcement official’s
“request.”198
These sectoral statutes and rules apply in limited areas. Where they do
apply, they impose few substantive limits, despite some procedural disci-
pline, on government access to third-party data. And they offer no guidance
whatsoever as to the proper role or limits of government data mining.
V. DATA MINING ISSUES
Government data mining, especially of personal information obtained
from third parties, presents many issues. The most important of those issues
align roughly around two main themes.  First, efficacy: does data mining
work and work well enough to warrant the financial and human resources
that it requires?  Second, impact: will data mining, or the aggregation of
private sector data in government hands, deter lawful behavior or otherwise
harm individuals? These two broad categories of issues are interrelated.
Questions about efficacy will always affect the assessment of the impact of
data mining on individuals. After all, if data mining does not work, it does
not justify any negative impact on individuals. Conversely, if its harmful
impact is very low, even marginally successful data mining might be appro-
priate if used as an additional layer of protection against a particularly grave
threat.
A. Efficacy
The first set of issues concerns the efficacy of government data mining:
how well does it work to achieve its intended objectives? Mounting evidence
suggests that data mining is not likely to be effective for many of the pur-
poses for which the government seeks to use it, especially in the national
security and law enforcement arenas. Not only have government officials
failed to identify any successful efforts to detect or prevent terrorist activity
based on analysis of databases, there are significant obstacles to such efforts
succeeding. These include the impediments presented by data quality issues,
196 Id. §§ 1681u, 1681v.
197 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, §§ 164.502, 164.506).
198 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2005).
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difficulties with data matching, and limits in data mining tools, especially
when data mining in the national security setting is contrasted with data
mining for commercial target marketing.
1. Data Quality
In its examination of data mining for national security, the Congres-
sional Research Service (“CRS”) noted that “[d]ata quality is a mul-
tifaceted issue that represents one of the biggest challenges for data
mining.”199 The CRS went on to note that the “presence of duplicate records,
the lack of data standards, the timeliness of updates, and human error can
significantly impact the effectiveness of the more complex data mining tech-
niques, which are sensitive to subtle differences that may exist in data.”200 In
1997 and again in 2002, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) found that data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(the predecessor of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) was “seri-
ously flawed in content and accuracy.”201 A December 2006 report by the
SSA’s Inspector General found that 4.1% of the records it surveyed (or an
estimated 17.8 million total records) in the SSA’s NUMIDENT database—
the backbone identification verification tool for social service and other fed-
eral programs—contained “discrepancies in the name, date of birth or citi-
zenship status of the numberholder” or concerned deceased individuals.202
The fact that government data mining almost always involves
“repurposing” data—i.e., using data for a purpose different from that for
which they were originally collected and stored—further exacerbates con-
cerns about the accuracy of the underlying data. For example, for its CAPPS
II program, TSA proposed accessing credit report information and other pri-
vate-sector data to help determine what level risk a potential passenger
posed.203 Current aviation and border security data mining initiatives include
199 SEIFERT, supra note 10, at CRS-21. R
200 Id.
201 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE’S ABILITY TO PROVIDE TIMELY AND ACCURATE ALIEN INFORMATION TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NO. I-2003-001) at 25 (2002), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0301/final.pdf; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON INS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTROL OF NONIMMIGRANT
OVERSTAYS (NO. I-2002-006) (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/
e0206/index.htm; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NAT-
URALIZATION SERVICE MONITORING OF NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS (NO. I-97-08) (1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/e9708/index.htm. See generally Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Spotlight on Surveillance, E-Verify System: DHS Changes Name,
But Problems Remain for U.S. Workers (July 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spot
light/0707/.
202 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT:
ACCURACY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S NUMIDENT FILE (A-08-06-26100),
at ii (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-08-06-26100.pdf.
203 SIEFERT, supra note 11, at CRS-9.
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data from passenger records such as frequent traveler numbers.204 One might
reasonably ask whether these data were collected and stored with the degree
of attention to accuracy appropriate for making security-related
determinations.
Questions about the provenance of the data are especially acute in the
national security context because the stakes of errors are so high for individ-
uals and society. Many records contain errors, especially records maintained
for uses where accuracy is not a paramount concern or the subject of signifi-
cant resources. As noted in Computerworld magazine in 2003, “[a] single
piece of dirty data might seem like a trivial problem, but if you multiply that
‘trivial’ problem by thousands or millions of pieces of erroneous, duplicated
or inconsistent data, it becomes a prescription for chaos.”205 The problem of
inaccurate data is multiplied, not diminished, when records in databases of
varying accuracy are combined. The accuracy of records raises important
practical concerns about the value of national security analyses performed
on potentially bad data as well.
2. Data Matching
Errors in linking data are a major contributor to inaccuracies in data
mining. Many factors contribute to the difficulty of integrating data
accurately:
• Names may be recorded in a variety of different ways in different
records (e.g., J. Smith, J.Q. Smith, John Q. Smith).
• Individuals, especially women, change their names. There are ap-
proximately 2.3 million marriages and 1.1 million divorces every
year in the United States, often resulting in changed last names (and
also changed addresses).206
• Many people have the same name.
• Many individuals have more than one address (e.g., home, office,
vacation home, post office box), and are likely to change addresses.
As of 1998 there were 6 million vacation or second homes in the
United States, many of which were used as temporary or second ad-
dresses.207 And, according to the U.S. Postal Service, about 43 mil-
lion Americans—approximately seventeen percent of the U.S.
population—change addresses every year.208
204 See 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 67, at 22-23. R
205 Tommy Peterson, Data Scrubbing, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 10, 2003, at 32.
206 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, VOL. 51,
NO. 8, at 1 tbl.A (2003).
207 Identity Theft: Hearing on H.R. 4311 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
106th Cong., (2000) (statement of Stuart K. Pratt, V.P., Associated Credit Bureaus).
208 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICA-
TIONS, LATEST FACTS UPDATE (Jun. 24, 2002), available at http://usps.com/news/facts/lfu_062
402.htm.
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• The systems in which different data are stored may be incompatible
and the process of overcoming interoperability issues may introduce
additional errors.209
Inclusion of Social Security Numbers (“SSNs”) improves the likeli-
hood of a correct match to the accountholder, but even when accounts in-
clude SSNs, identification may be difficult because accounts for the same
household may reflect different primary SSNs (e.g., husband, wife, minor
beneficiary) and because of the presence of transcription errors in recording
strings of numbers. Moreover, data about potential terrorists are unlikely to
include SSNs.
A 2002 study by the Consumer Federation of America and the National
Credit Reporting Association concluded that “almost one in ten consumers
runs the risk of being excluded from the credit marketplace altogether be-
cause of incomplete records, duplicate files, and mixed files,”210 despite the
fact that credit report files are among the most heavily regulated business
databases. Their report goes on to note that “[u]se of nicknames, misspell-
ings, transposed social security numbers, and mixed files that report infor-
mation under one person’s name, but match that name to a spouse’s social
security number, are all examples of variations that can result from an auto-
mated interpretation of complex and sometimes contradictory personal iden-
tifying data.”211
The problem is by no means limited to businesses or not-for-profit or-
ganizations. As discussed in greater detail below, the government faces a
similar challenge in accurately matching data and people, especially in its
anti-terrorism and law enforcement efforts. Post-September 11 programs for
enhanced border, critical infrastructure, and passenger facility security all
depend on being able to identify individuals and assess the risk they present
by quickly connecting to accurate information about them. This is a substan-
tial challenge, as stressed in the 2004 final report of Technology and Privacy
Advisory Committee (“TAPAC”), the “blue ribbon”212 bipartisan indepen-
dent committee appointed by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in
2003 to examine privacy and security issues following the controversy over
TIA:
209 See SIEFERT, supra note 10, at CRS-22. R
210 CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT SCORE ACCU-
RACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 39 (2002).
211 Id. at 35.
212 Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond the “War” on Terrorism: Towards the
New Intelligence Network, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1446, 1467 (2005). The TAPAC comprised eight
senior statespeople with expansive government and corporate experience. See Fred H. Cate,
Terrorism, Technology, and Information Privacy: Finding the Balance, BILL OF PARTICULARS,
Fall 2004 at 5-6, available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/publications/particulars/2004fall.pdf
(“The eight members (of TAPAC) read like a who’s who of government, law, industry, and
higher education . . . They represent all three branches of government, including one federal
appellate court judge, one member of Congress, two cabinet secretaries, an attorney general,
three White House lawyers . . . and one chair of the FCC.”).
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Integrating and analyzing a large volume of data such as credit
card transactions or airline ticket bookings raise many practical
issues, even before considering the potential privacy threat. One of
the most significant of these issues concerns the significant diffi-
culties of integrating data accurately. Business and government
have long struggled with how to ensure that information about one
person is correctly attributed to that individual and only to that
individual.213
Overcoming the many obstacles to linking data accurately is a major
challenge for all organizations. International Data Corporation, a worldwide
market research, analysis, and consulting firm, estimates that the process of
accurately and rapidly integrating new data is the most critical part of man-
aging and using customer databases, consuming up to seventy percent of an
organization’s total information technology resources.214 Even in well-de-
signed data-based studies such as those developed by the Census Bureau,
automated matching is only seventy-five percent accurate and hand-match-
ing of records is required to reduce the error rates substantially.215
The task of integrating data accurately is especially difficult in the
counter-terrorism arena, which often involves matching data from disparate
systems over which the intelligence community has no control, from in-
tercepts and other sources where little or no identifying information is pro-
vided, and in ways that prevent seeking or verifying additional identifying
information. The fact that many government data mining applications in-
volve searches across incompatible datasets and unstructured data (e.g., au-
dio and video surveillance records) exacerbates the aforementioned
concerns.
In addition, even when data are accurately aggregated, the file or data
mining result must then be linked to the right person. A number of reasons
make this significantly challenging in the national security arena. The
problems associated with misidentifying people, including well-known
figures such as Senator Edward Kennedy, on the current “do not fly” lists
are well documented.216 These problems are further exacerbated by the poor
quality of most identity documents and the ease with which fraudulent docu-
ments may be obtained. Some of the September 11 hijackers had false iden-
tification documents, either forgeries or legitimate driver’s licenses issued by
213 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 37. R
214 Emily Kay, Coordinating Supply Chain Data: To Deliver Timely Information, Compa-
nies Must Overcome Data Synchronization Hurdles, FRONTLINE SOLUTIONS, May 1, 2003, at
21.
215 MARGO ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FEINBERG, WHO COUNTS? THE POLITICS OF CENSUS-
TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 117-18 (Russell Sage Found. 1999).
216 See Editorial, Glitches Repeatedly Delay Innocent Air Travelers, USA TODAY, June 25,
2003, at 11A.
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states to the wrong person.217 Moreover, photographs on driver’s licenses and
passports, which are issued for terms of between four and ten years, often
provide poor verification of identity. Better forms of identification, such as
biometric identifiers (e.g., fingerprints or retinal scans), are not widely used
today and raise significant questions about their cost, reliability, and impact
on privacy.
The critical issues surrounding data mining efficacy, therefore, include
concerns about the provenance of the data and ensuring that they were
matched accurately before coming into the government’s control, during the
process of data mining, and when the results are linked to specific
individuals.
3. Data Mining Tools in Context
The third set of issues affecting the effectiveness of data mining is the
quality of the analytical tools—the search algorithms and target patterns—
being used and how useful they are in the contexts in which they are increas-
ingly being deployed. We have limited data about the experience of govern-
ment, especially in the national security setting, because so much of the data
mining is both new and classified. The experience of industry, however,
which is generally acknowledged to be ahead of the government in develop-
ing and deploying data mining technologies, is not encouraging on the suc-
cess of data mining. For example, even sophisticated target marketing, which
relies heavily on data mining, recorded an average response rate of 2.24
percent for catalog promotions and 2.15 percent for direct mail in the year
2007.218 Those figures suggest a high false positive rate—the proportion of
people or activities wrongly identified by data mining.
Data mining for national security and law enforcement presents far
greater challenges than data mining for target marketing for many reasons.
For example, government data mining is often searching for a far smaller
population of targets than is the case in the private sector. Without knowing
the precise number of potential terrorists in the United States, the figure is
certain to be far smaller than the population of potential customers most
marketers wish to target. Moreover, terrorists and other criminals are work-
ing hard to blend in. Government data mining often is searching for a needle
not in a haystack, but among millions of other needles.
Further, the government has a much harder time knowing the patterns it
is looking for. Most marketers have thousands or even millions of customers
upon whose actual behavior they can base patterns for data mining. This was
a key point in the 2007 CRS report on Data Mining and Homeland Security:
217 See JIM HARPER, IDENTITY CRISIS 207 n.10 (2006); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST AT-
TACKS ON THE U.S., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 390 (2004).
218 Press Release, Direct Marketing Association, DMA Releases 5th Annual “Response
Rate Trends Report” (Oct. 13, 2007), available at http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/disppressrelease
?article=1008 (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
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“Successful ‘predictive data mining’ requires a significant number of known
instances of a particular behavior in order to develop valid predictive mod-
els. For example, data mining used to predict types of consumer behavior . . .
may be based on as many as millions of previous instances of the same
particular behavior.”219 Government agencies, fortunately, have limited ex-
perience with terrorists on U.S. soil. Moreover, domestic terrorist attacks
actually rarely follow a pattern: each one is new and different. As a result,
intelligence officials can imagine attack strategies and they can learn from
past terrorists activities, but they have comparatively few opportunities to
test the accuracy of their analysis and little reason to think that analyses
based on past attacks will be useful in anticipating future ones. “With a
relatively small number of attempts every year and only one or two major
terrorist incidents every few years—each one distinct in terms of planning
and execution—there are no meaningful patterns that show what behavior
indicates planning or preparation for terrorism.”220
One corollary to limited frequency and individuality of terrorist acts
within the United States is that national security data mining efforts, like
other aspects of homeland security, tend to be backwards focused. Consider
the U.S. approach to aviation security: after the 9/11 attacks, in which ter-
rorists used box cutters to take over passenger airplanes, the government
banned not only box cutters but anything that resembled them—nail clip-
pers, nail files, pocket knives.221 Only after Richard Reid attempted to blow
up an airplane by detonating explosives hidden in his shoes, did TSA offi-
cials begin screening shoes.222 It was only after British officials discovered a
plot to blow up airplanes with liquid explosives—a threat anti-terrorism offi-
cials had known about for more than a decade—that the TSA began restrict-
ing liquids allowed to be carried on planes.223 In each case, the government’s
action was wholly reactive to the most recently demonstrated threat, rather
than proactive in responding to known threats whether or not they had been
attempted. Government data mining seems similarly likely to be fighting
yesterday’s battles—a problem that commercial data miners face to a far less
extent, since the characteristics of desirable consumers are likely to change
far less rapidly than those of terrorists.
Another challenge faced by national security data mining is the desire
of terrorists not to be found. Commercial data mining is generally searching
for potential customers who either want to be discovered or do not care if
they are found. Government data mining, by contrast, is often looking for
terrorists or criminals who do not want to be located and therefore may be
219 SEIFERT, supra note 10, at CRS-3. R
220 JEFF JONAS & JIM HARPER, CATO INSTITUTE, EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE
LIMITED ROLE OF PREDICTIVE DATA MINING 7-8 (2006).
221 Steven Greenhouse, The New Property, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at A16.
222 See Hector Becerra, Jennifer Oldham & Mitchell Landsberg, Airline Terrorism Alert;
Winging It Once Again, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1.
223 See id.
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assumed to be trying to hide their identities and behaviors from government
sight.
“False positives” are a much bigger concern when searching for ter-
rorists than for customers. According to Paul Rosenzweig, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy at DHS, “[t]he only certainty [in data mining] is that
there will be false positives.”224 In the commercial setting, false positives do
not matter much because people erroneously targeted can simply discard the
mail or e-mail solicitation, and the marginal costs associated with those
wasted communications are comparatively small. False negatives—failing to
target appropriate individuals—while thought to be high are also not particu-
larly problematic because there are other means of communicating with
those people, and they can always seek out the solicitation if they desire it
(e.g., by visiting a store, calling an 800- number, etc.).
The situation with government data mining is wholly different. Even if
falsity rates are very low, the consequences in the national security settings
are difficult to exaggerate. For example, if a data mining system intended to
keep potential terrorists off of airplanes yielded a false positive rate of only
one percent—a far better rate than that achieved by publicly disclosed gov-
ernment or commercial data mining—that would still mean that 7.4 million
travelers (one percent of the 739 million passengers that the TSA screened in
2005)225 would have been wrongly identified as terrorist suspects. These are
not speculative issues. The TSA operated its data-based passenger screening
programs for more than two years with no system in place to report or cor-
rect errors, despite the fact that innocent passengers were routinely denied or
delayed in boarding aircraft.226 And DHS continued to use and expand its
automated employment verification system even though as many as forty-
two percent of employees who received “final nonconfirmation” notices
were in fact eligible to work.227 False positives which result in innocent peo-
ple being detained, denied boarding on airplanes, denied employment, or
subject to additional investigation not only inconvenience individuals and
threaten constitutionally protected rights, they also consume significant re-
sources and may undermine security by diverting attention from real threats.
The consequences of false negatives may be even greater, by failing to de-
tect potential terrorists or criminals or to prevent their nefarious activities.
Moreover, valid targets overlooked by government data mining are unlikely
to seek means to self-identify.
224 PAUL ROSENZWEIG, HERITAGE LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS SYSTEM (2003).
225 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 672 (2007).
226 See Del Quentin Wilber, Fliers’ Data Left Exposed, Report Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 12,
2008, at D1.
227 INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY & WESTAT, INS BASIC PILOT
EVALUATION SUMMARY REPORT 25 (2002), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedoc-
uments/INSBASICpilot_summ_jan292002.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
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In light of these significant issues, many experts argue that using data
mining to detect and prevent terrorist attacks is far more difficult than using
it for commercial application. One of the bluntest assessments comes from
Jeff Jonas, chief scientist of IBM’s Entity Analytic Solutions Group, and Jim
Harper, director of information policy studies at the Cato Institute: “Data
mining is not an effective way to discover incipient terrorism. Though data
mining has many valuable uses, it is not well suited to the terrorist discovery
problem.”228 This reveals the need for the government to examine carefully
its current and planned data mining programs to determine whether they in
fact work, and if so, work well enough to justify their costs—financial and
otherwise.
4. Assessing Efficacy
There is nearly universal agreement about the need to assess the effi-
cacy of data mining systems. Many of the committees created to examine
various aspects of government data mining and information use have pro-
posed ways of doing so. One of the earliest proposals came from TAPAC,
which recommended to the Secretary of Defense that any DOD data mining
program should require a “written finding” by the “agency head” specify-
ing, among other things:
i. the purposes for which the system may be used;
ii. the need for the data to accomplish that purpose;
iii. the specific uses to which the data will be put;
iv. that the data are appropriate for that use, taking into account the
purpose(s) for which the data were collected, their age, and the
conditions under which they have been stored and protected;
v. that other equally effective but less intrusive means of achieving
the same purpose are either not practically available or are al-
ready being used;
vi. the effect(s) on individuals identified through the data mining . . .
vii. that the system has been demonstrated to his or her satisfaction
to be effective and appropriate for that purpose; . . .
ix. that the system yields a rate of false positives that is acceptable in
view of the purpose of the search, the severity of the effect of
being identified, and the likelihood of further investigation.229
These recommendations are designed to ensure that data mining pro-
grams are not deployed without being shown to be effective for specific
purposes, and to rely on data that are appropriate to those purposes.  Moreo-
ver, they are intended to ensure that those purposes are served without un-
necessarily burdening individuals or intruding into protected rights.  The
recommendations require an explicit balancing between the goals to be
228 JONAS & HARPER, supra note 220, at 2. R
229 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 49-50. R
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achieved and the likelihood of achieving them on the one hand, and the
impact on individuals on the other hand.  Finally, by requiring written au-
thorization by a senior government official, the TAPAC recommendations
help to ensure that decision to engage in data mining are taken seriously, that
the required determinations are undertaken explicitly, and that an individual
is identified to be held accountable if they are not. As John O. Marsh, Jr., a
TAPAC member, former member of Congress, and the longest-serving Sec-
retary of the Army, testified before the House Judiciary Committee, “[W]e
believed that accountability was absolutely critical to . . . ensuring that data
mining was conducted efficiently and effectively, . . . [and that it] would be
enhanced, we believed, first by ensuring that no agency engage in data min-
ing involving personal information without making a conscious, thoughtful
decision to do so.”230
Despite the burden that the process of assessing efficacy clearly will
present, it is essential. The argument that the perceived danger is too great to
allow time for meaningful assessment is exactly backwards. The perceived
severity of the terrorist threat only enhances the importance of ensuring that
we invest our efforts in measures calculated to work. Investing in ineffective
tools can seriously undermine security, divert scarce resources, and compro-
mise public confidence, as well as endanger privacy. Assessment is critical
at all times to ensure that the government is doing not merely “something,”
but the best thing in light of the available resources.
B. Impact
1. Data Mining and Privacy
Data mining that involves personal data necessarily affects personal pri-
vacy. This is the consistent conclusion of every inquiry into government data
mining, from the 1973 report of the HEW Advisory Committee on Auto-
mated Personal Data Systems231 to the 2004 TAPAC report.232 “[D]ata min-
ing concerning U.S. persons inevitably raises privacy issues.”233
Perhaps the greatest impact of data mining on individual privacy is that
individuals will change their behavior as a result of their awareness that the
government may, without probable cause or other specific authorization, ob-
tain access to myriad distributed stores of information about them. The origi-
nal motto of the TIA program—Scientia Est Potentia—is certainly correct:
230 Privacy and Civil Liberties in the Hands of Government Post-September 22, 2001:
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the U.S. Department of Defense Technology
and Privacy Advisory Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Adminis-
trative Law and Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
5 (2004) (statement of John O. Marsh, Jr., TAPAC).
231 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 168. R
232 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9.
233 Id. at 48.
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“knowledge is power.” Knowledge that the government is, or even may be,
observing data we generate through thousands of ordinary activities can alter
the way people live their lives and interact with others.
It is this principle that was at the heart of Jeremy Bentham’s concept of
the Panopticon—a model prison consisting of a central tower surrounded by
a ring of prison cells.234 One-way windows would allow a person in the
tower to see into the prison cells but would prevent the prisoners from seeing
into the tower. Bentham posited that a single inspector in the tower could
control the behavior of all of the prisoners through making each prisoner
“conceive himself to be . . . constantly . . . inspected.”235 Applying the analy-
sis of philosopher and historian Michel Foucault, Professor Slobogin argues
that, “modern society increasingly functions like a super Panopticon,” in
which government constrains individual behavior by the threat of
surveillance.236
This may not always be a bad outcome, but knowledge of the govern-
ment’s surveillance power can cause people to change their behavior to be
more consistent with a perceived social norm, to mask their behavior, and to
reduce their activities or participation in society to avoid the surveillance.
More than forty years ago, Vice President Hubert Humphrey observed,
“[w]e act differently if we believe we are being observed. If we can never
be sure whether or not we are being watched and listened to, all our actions
will be altered and our very character will change.”237 Therefore, govern-
ment data mining in a democracy threatens not merely information privacy
but other civil liberties, including freedom of expression, association, and
religion. In the words of professor and former Deputy Attorney General
Philip Heymann, “[n]o matter how honest the government was in restricting
its uses of the data, many citizens would become more cautious in their
activities, including being less outspoken in their dissent to government poli-
cies. For two hundred years Americans have proudly distrusted their
government.”238
The impact on individual behavior is far more direct when individuals
are identified through data mining for additional scrutiny, denied boarding,
or detained. When that identification is in error, as the prior discussion sug-
gests it frequently is, the injury becomes one that the government must take
234 See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE 5-8 (T. Payne 1791)
(1787).
235 Id. at 3; see also Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Explo-
ration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1995).
236 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 241 (2002) (citing Michel Foucault, Discipline & Pun-
ish 187 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
237 Hubert H. Humphrey, Foreword to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS, at viii (1967).
238 Philip B. Heymann, Investigative Uses of Files of Data About Many People Collected
for Other Purposes 9 (2003) (unpublished manuscript).
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into account when deploying the data mining system and must be prepared
to address.
2. Assessing Impact
To minimize the harmful impact of government data mining on individ-
uals and assess the magnitude of that impact in light of the value that the
nation has historically placed on privacy and other civil liberties, every
group to consider the issue has recommended some form of legal process in
addition to the little required under current law.
For example, TAPAC recommended five new legal requirements to ad-
dress the impact of government data mining on individuals and minimize it
to the extent possible. The first would condition most data mining on a
“[w]ritten finding by agency head authorizing data mining.”239 The finding
would have to address, in addition to the points already discussed, “that
other equally effective but less intrusive means of achieving the same pur-
pose are either not practically available or are already being used;” “the
effect(s) on individuals identified through the data mining (e.g., they will be
the subject of further investigation for which a warrant will be sought, they
will be subject to additional scrutiny before being allowed to board an air-
craft, etc.);” and “that there is a system in place for dealing with false posi-
tives (e.g., reporting false positives to developers to improve the system,
correcting incorrect information if possible, remedying the effects of false
positives as quickly as practicable, etc.), including identifying the frequency
and effects of false positives.”240
TAPAC’s second recommendation would require “[d]ata mining of
databases known or reasonably likely to include personally identifiable in-
formation about U.S. persons”241 to employ a series of “technical require-
239 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 49. TAPAC recommended applying R
its new legal framework to “all DOD programs involving data mining concerning U.S. per-
sons” except for “data mining (1) based on particularized suspicion (including searches of
passenger manifests and similar lists); (2) that is limited to foreign intelligence that does not
involve U.S. persons; or (3) that concerns federal government employees in connection with
their employment.” Id. The committee noted that “these three areas are already subject to
extensive regulation, which we do not propose expanding.” Id. The committee also recom-
mended that “data mining that is limited to information that is routinely available without
charge or subscription to the public—on the Internet, in telephone directories, or in public
records to the extent authorized by law” should be subject to only the written authorization
and compliance audit requirements. Id.
240 Id. at 50.
241 Id.
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ments,”242 including “[d]ata minimization,”243 “[d]ata anonymization,”244
“[a]udit trail,”245 “[s]ecurity and access,”246 and “[t]raining.”247
The fourth248 TAPAC recommendation for protecting personal privacy
in government data mining would require judicial authorization from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for searches—or entire data
mining programs—that would involve the use of “personally identifiable
information” about U.S. persons.249 That authorization would depend on
“specific and articulable facts” that:
i. The search will be conducted in a manner that otherwise complies
with the requirements of these recommendations however enacted;
ii. The use of personally identifiable information is reasonably re-
lated to identifying or apprehending terrorists, preventing terrorist
attacks, or locating or preventing the use of weapons of mass
destruction;
iii. The search is likely to yield information reasonably related to
identifying or apprehending terrorists, preventing terrorist attacks,
or locating or preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction;
and
iv. The search is not practicable with anonymized data in light of all
of the circumstances . . . .250
242 Id.
243 Id. (“[T]he least data consistent with the purpose of the data mining should be ac-
cessed, disseminated, and retained.”).
244 Id. (“[W]henever practicable data mining should be performed on databases from
which information by which specific individuals can be commonly identified (e.g., name, ad-
dress, telephone number, SSN, unique title, etc.) has been removed, encrypted, or otherwise
obscured.”).
245 Id. (“[D]ata mining systems should be designed to create a permanent, tamper-resis-
tant record of when data have been accessed and by whom.”).
246 Id. (“[D]ata mining systems should be secured against accidental or deliberate unau-
thorized access, use, alteration, or destruction, and access to such systems should be restricted
to persons with a legitimate need and protected by appropriate access controls taking into
account the sensitivity of the data.”).
247 Id. (“[A]ll persons engaged in developing or using data mining systems should be
trained in their appropriate use and the laws and regulations applicable to their use.”).
248 The third TAPAC recommendation is not directly relevant to this discussion and is
omitted here. See id. at 52.
249 Id. at 51.
250 Id. FISC authorization meeting similar requirements would be required to reidentify
search results conducted with anonymized or pseudonymized personal data. Id. at 52. The
recommendations also include a provision dealing with “exigent circumstances,” which would
allow the government to engage in data mining without FISC authorization. According to that
provision:
Without obtaining a court order, the government may, in exigent circumstances,
search personally identifiable information or reidentify anonymized information ob-
tained through data mining if:
i. The agency head or his or her single designee certifies that it is impracticable
to obtain a written order in light of all of the circumstances (e.g., the type of
data, type of search, the need for the personally identifiable information, and
other issues affecting the timing of the search), and provides a copy of that
certification to the privacy officer;
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Fifth, TAPAC recommended that data mining “known or reasonably
likely to include personally identifiable information about U.S. persons
should be audited not less than annually to ensure compliance” with these
requirements.251
Finally, TAPAC recommended administrative and reporting changes to
enhance accountability and transparency concerning data mining. These in-
cluded training, which was included under the “Technical Requirements”
already discussed, the appointment of a “policy-level privacy officer,”252 the
creation of “a panel of external advisors,”253 and the establishment of other
“meaningful oversight mechanisms,”254 including an annual report to Con-
gress and, “[t]o the extent consistent with national security and applicable
classification laws and regulations,” the public.255
These recommendations thus create a significant incentive for using
anonymized or pseudonymized data whenever possible and providing for
systemic privacy protections and judicial oversight when not possible. De-
spite their far-reaching scope, they were accepted by the Department of De-
fense (“DOD”) in August 2006.256
The TAPAC recommendations reflect the deep-seated view that privacy
is a value that matters in its own right, and it is inevitably affected by gov-
ernment data mining.257 As a result, TAPAC recommended the adoption of
laws that would subject government data mining with personally identifiable
information to external authorization from a court and external oversight
from the judiciary and Congress.258 TAPAC thus sought to fill the gap cre-
ated by judicial and legislative inaction and to ensure that government data
mining would be subject to the checks and balances of constitutionally di-
vided government.
In the quest to protect individuals from the undesirable impact of gov-
ernment data mining programs, most of the TAPAC recommendations are
primarily procedural. They do not purport to determine whether the govern-
ment should engage in data mining or even how it should be conducted.
ii. DOD subsequently applies to the court for a written order within 48 hours or,
in the event of a catastrophic attack against the United States, as soon as prac-
ticable; and
iii. The agency terminates any on-going searches of personally identifiable infor-
mation or use of reidentified information obtained through data mining if the
court does not grant the order. Id.
251 Id. at 50.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 53.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 55.
256 See Letter from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Carol E. Dinkins,
Chair, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Bd. (Sep. 22, 2006) (on file with the Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review) (attaching a list of TAPAC’s recommendations with
each of those applicable to the DOD initialed by the Deputy Secretary as “approved”).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 232-250. R
258 See supra text accompanying notes 239-255, 274-281. R
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Instead, most of the recommendations set forth how those decisions should
be made and who should make them. The committees’ recommendations ap-
pear to be designed to facilitate discipline and rationality by those who de-
velop and deploy data mining programs; meaningful oversight by
policymakers, legislators, and judges; and accountability throughout the
process.
Even when the committee’s recommendations include substantive
terms, most would leave it to individual agencies, subject to judicial and
legislative oversight, to define the specific content of the substantive require-
ments. For example, while the recommendations instruct agencies to employ
appropriate access controls on personal data, explicitly determine whether a
system provides an acceptable rate of false positives, and engage in data
mining whenever practicable with anonymized or pseudonymized personal
data, they leave to those agencies the determination of which access controls
are “appropriate,” how many false positives are “acceptable,” and when it
is “practicable” to use anonymized or pseudonymized personal data.
This deference undoubtedly reflects many factors: the fact that technol-
ogy and threats are constantly changing, that much government data mining
takes place in secret and so is hard to set specific standards in public docu-
ments, and that many determinations concerning the impact of data mining
inevitably are context-specific. In fact, TAPAC and most of the other initia-
tives concerning the proper conduct of government data mining recommend
only one substantive and absolute requirement: government data mining
should comply with applicable law.259
C. The Link Between Privacy and Security
Concerns about data quality and the impact of data mining, although
often described in the literature in the context of national security as raising
privacy concerns, also inevitably raise significant security concerns. For ex-
ample, if data mining does not work for its intended purpose, whether or not
it invades privacy, it may compromise security. In short, while the discus-
sion of data mining issues might be thought useful in helping to balance
privacy with security, it is really more focused on ensuring that data mining
is conducted in such a way as to enhance both privacy and security.
Good privacy protection not only can help build support for data min-
ing and other tools to enhance security, it can also contribute to making
those tools more effective. For example, data integrity—ensuring that data
are accurate, complete, up-to-date, and appropriately stored and linked—is a
key privacy principle. But it clearly enhances security as well. Legal obliga-
tions requiring data integrity inevitably make those data more useful for se-
curity application.
259 See TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 46. R
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In March 2003, the DOJ exempted the FBI’s NCIC from the Privacy
Act’s requirements that data be “accurate, relevant, timely and complete,”260
and in August 2003, the DHS exempted the TSA’s passenger screening
database from the Privacy Act’s requirements that government records in-
clude only “relevant and necessary” personal information.261 These efforts to
avoid privacy obligations raise important security issues as well. Mis-
matched data and misidentified individuals pose serious risks for both pri-
vacy and security.
Similarly, the DOD Inspector General’s December 2003 audit of TIA
concluded that the DOD’s failure to consider privacy adequacy during the
early development of TIA led the Department to “risk[] spending funds to
develop systems that may not be either deployable or used to their fullest
potential without costly revision.”262 The report noted that this was particu-
larly true with regard to the potential deployment of TIA for law enforce-
ment: “DARPA need[ed] to consider how TIA will be used in terms of law
enforcement to ensure that privacy is built into the developmental pro-
cess.”263 Greater consideration of how the technology might be used would
not only have served privacy, but also likely contributed to making TIA
more useful.
As this example suggests, privacy protections often build discipline into
counter-terrorism efforts that serves other laudatory purposes. By making
the government stop and justify its effort to a senior official, a congressional
committee, or a federal judge, warrant requirements and other privacy pro-
tections often help bring focus and precision to law enforcement and na-
tional security efforts. As TAPAC noted in the introduction to its
recommendations for new privacy protections:
Our conclusion, therefore, that data mining concerning U.S. per-
sons inevitably raises privacy issues, does not in any way suggest
that the government should not have the power to engage in data
mining, subject to appropriate legal and technological protections.
Quite the contrary, we believe that those protections are essential
so that the government can engage in appropriate data mining
when necessary to fight terrorism and defend our nation. And we
believe that those protections are needed to provide clear guidance
to DOD personnel engaged in anti-terrorism activities.264
260 Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. 14140, 14140 (Mar. 14, 2003)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 16).
261 Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemption, 68 Fed. Reg. 49410, 49412 (Aug.
8, 2003) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1507).
262 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGE-
MENT: TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM (D-2004-033) at 4 (2003).
263 Id. at 7.
264 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 48. R
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Privacy and national security are also inherently linked because there
are limits as to how much of the former the public is willing to trade in
pursuit of the latter. The clear lesson of the series of controversies over data
mining programs is that the American people will rebel and policymakers
will change direction in an instant if they believe that privacy is being
threatened too much or unnecessarily. With TIA, as we have seen, Congress
restricted development and then terminated funding entirely, at least from
the public budget.265 The originator of the concept, Admiral John Poindexter,
was forced to resign in the wake of the controversy.266 Other programs have
been similarly retarded by a privacy backlash. In response to public and
political pressure, Delta Air Lines withdrew from a CAPPS II pilot program
after the airline was threatened with a boycott,267 and the Secretary of Home-
land Security ultimately terminated CAPPS II.268
The experience of companies who have participated in supplying data
to the government for data mining is illuminating. When JetBlue, Northwest,
and American, at the urging of DOD and TSA, provided millions of passen-
ger records to defense contractor Torch Concepts to help test a security sys-
tem it was designing, they were rewarded with multiple class-action lawsuits
by outraged customers.269 Financial network SWIFT endured multiple inves-
tigations from European data protection commissioners and a suit in federal
court in Chicago for its role in supplying the Treasury with access to con-
sumer records.270 AT&T and Verizon face more than three dozen lawsuits for
their alleged role in providing the federal government with bulk access to
billing records and potentially telephone traffic.271 The debate over whether
they and other firms should be provided immunity for their role in supplying
data for data mining has occupied the U.S. Congress for months.272
In short, the lack of legal clarity over the role of the private sector in
supplying massive data sets to the government, and the resulting backlash
when that role is disclosed, raise the specter that valuable tools for enhanc-
ing security may be compromised as industry grows hesitant to share per-
sonal data with the government. In addition, government officials may grow
wary of data mining programs that threaten to embroil them in controversy
and may even cost them their jobs.
265 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131, 117
Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003).
266 See  Stephen J. Hedges, Poindexter to Quit over Terror Futures Plan, CHICAGO TRIB-
UNE, Aug. 1, 2003, at C1.
267 See  Sara Kehaulani Goo, Agency Got More Airline Records, WASH. POST, Jun. 24,
2004, at A16.
268 See  Hall & DeLollis, supra note 61, at 1A. R
269 See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Airlines Confirm Giving Passenger Data to FBI After 9/11,
WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at A14; Sara Kehaulani Goo, American Airlines Revealed Passen-
ger Data, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2004, at D12.
270 See Risen, supra note 74, at A6. R
271 See James Oliphant, Phone Firms Want Shield if Spy Suits Come Calling, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 2007, at C1.
272 See id.
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Moreover, as demonstrated in the controversy over TIA, promises by
government officials that data mining is limited to “lawfully obtained” data
may carry little weight with lawmakers or with the public in the absence of
meaningful legal constraints on accessing personal data, especially from the
private sector. Similarly, even though a particular data mining project might
be focused solely on a serious concern—for example, keeping terrorists off
of airplanes—that may warrant incursions into personal privacy, lawmakers
or journalists may nevertheless be skeptical because of the absence of legal
constraints that limit the data mining to that particularly important purpose.
As the Congressional Research Services has noted, “[m]ission creep is one
of the leading risks of data mining cited by civil libertarians.”273 Clear legal
standards applicable to data mining would facilitate not only privacy, but
also accountability, public, and policymaker confidence, and could increase
the willingness of the private sector to provide data for lawful counter-terror-
ism uses. The absence of those rules undermines efforts to protect privacy
and security.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Miller v. United States and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
created a broad gap in the privacy protection provided by the Fourth Amend-
ment by finding that the government’s seizure of personal information from
third parties is outside its scope. As a result, the government’s behavior need
not be reasonable nor is any judicial authorization required when the govern-
ment searches or seizes personal information held by third parties.
As striking as the Court’s decision was in 1976, in the face of thirty-two
years of technological developments since then, it means today that the gov-
ernment has at its disposal an extraordinary array of personal data that indi-
viduals necessarily deposit in the hands of third parties as we live our daily
lives. As we rely more and more on technologies, that situation will only
increase, until the Fourth Amendment is entirely swallowed up by the Miller
exclusion. Although Congress has responded with specific, sectoral statutes,
they are limited in their scope and in the protections they create. As a result,
the government’s ability to seize data from third parties is effectively
unregulated.
Until recently, the government has had little practical use for massive
data sets from the private sector. Significant advances in data mining tech-
nologies, however, now make it possible for the government to conduct so-
phisticated analysis, rapidly and affordably, of disparate databases without
ever physically bringing the data together. These technologies allow the gov-
ernment to move beyond looking for data on specific people to search data
about millions of Americans in the search for patterns of activity, subtle
relationships, and inferences about future behavior. These technologies and
273 SEIFERT, supra note 10, at CRS-22. R
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the terrorist attacks of September 11 mean that the government now has both
the ability and the motivation to explore huge arrays of private-sector data
about individuals who have done nothing to warrant government attention.
To date, Congress has failed to respond to this challenge. In fact, Congress
has behaved erratically toward data mining—requiring and encouraging it in
some settings and prohibiting it in others.
There is an urgent need for Congress and the Administration to address
this situation by creating clear legal standards for government data mining,
especially when it involves access to third-party data. There have been many
efforts to articulate some or all of the content of those standards, including
the work of TAPAC, the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security
in the Information Age,274 the Cantigny Conference on Counterterrorism
Technology and Privacy organized by the Standing Committee on Law and
National Security of the American Bar Association,275 as well as think tanks,
advocacy groups, academic institutions, and individuals.276
While proposals differ in their details, there is broad consensus on
many key points. Viewed together, they provide a clear case for why con-
gressional action is needed and the broad roadmap for what that action
should include. There is sweeping agreement about the critical need for Con-
gress to establish a legal framework for the appropriate use of data mining to
enhance both privacy and security and that the current law is wholly inade-
quate to that task. In the words of the TAPAC final report, “[l]aws regulat-
ing the collection and use of information about U.S. persons are often not
merely disjointed, but outdated.”277 They “fail to address extraordinary de-
velopments in digital technologies, including the Internet,” even though
those technologies have “greatly increased the government’s ability to ac-
cess data from diverse sources, including commercial and transactional
databases.”278 As a result, “[c]urrent laws are often inadequate to address
274 See TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, MARKLE FOUND.,
CREATING A TRUSTED NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2003); TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, MARKLE FOUND., MOBILIZING INFORMATION TO PREVENT
TERRORISM (2006); PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note
105. R
275 The Cantigny Principles on Technology, Terrorism, and Privacy, NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW REPORT, Feb. 2005, at 14.
276 See, e.g., JONAS & HARPER, supra note 220; Francesca Bignami, European Versus R
American Liberty: A Comparative Policy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 609 (2007); Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security, and
the “Adverse Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757
(2006); Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2008); David J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV.
1 (2005); K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2002-2003); Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining
Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731
(2006); Michael Isaac, Note, Privatizing Surveillance: The Use of Data Mining in Federal Law
Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1057 (2006).
277 TAPAC, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 9, at 6. R
278 Id.
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\43-2\HLC203.txt unknown Seq: 53 21-MAY-08 13:06
2008] Government Data Mining 487
the new and difficult challenges presented by dramatic developments in in-
formation technologies. And that inadequacy will only become more acute
as the store of digital data and the ability to search it continue to expand
dramatically in the future.”279 “It is time to update the law to respond to new
challenges.”280
That framework for regulating government data mining should include,
at a minimum, requirements for:
• Authorization by Congress or a senior administration official of new
data mining programs that seeks to ensure their efficacy, compliance
with legal requirements, and a high level of oversight and accounta-
bility within each federal agency.
• Compliance with the law both when accessing data and engaging in
data mining. The government should neither encourage nor press
third parties to violate their legal obligation when providing data to
the government.
• Evaluation of effectiveness in accomplishing specified objectives
prior to being deployed and regularly thereafter. Those assessments
should take into account practical experience with the system, tech-
nological advances, changing needs, and the impact on individuals.
• Limits on who can use data mining systems, have access to large data
sets, and purposes for that use, as well as tools to enforce those lim-
its. Rules can be built into data mining systems so, for example, “the
analyst might be asked to specify whether she has a search warrant,
and if she does not, the system might not allow her to retrieve certain
kinds of information.”281
• Some form of judicial authorization before data mining systems are
deployed or used where personally identifiable information will be
used in a way that affects U.S. persons, whether by denying or delay-
ing access to a facility or benefit, subjecting them to intrusive inves-
tigation, or in some other way. The specific court matters less than
that the authorization be external to the agency engaging in the data
mining and specified by Congress.
• The use of data minimization and anonymization and other tools to
limit the amount of information revealed to only what is necessary
and authorized. This has been a major focus of the Markle Founda-
tion Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, which
has proposed that “anonymizing technologies . . . allow analysts to
perform link analysis among data sets without disclosing personally
identifiable information. By employing techniques such as one-way
hashing, masking, and blind matching, analysts can perform their
279 Id.
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jobs . . . without the need to gain access to personal data until they
make the requisite showing for disclosure.”282
• The use of audit tools to ensure that the rules surrounding data min-
ing are being followed.
• A system of redress to ensure that innocent individuals harmed by
data mining are aware of the role of data mining, given the opportu-
nity consistent with the nature of the data mining to dispute and seek
correction of erroneous data, and compensated for their injury. The
system must also ensure that data mining programs “learn” from
their mistakes and that those errors are logged. If false positives are
“inevitable,” they must be addressed from the perspective of both
affected individuals and the systems that are generating them.
• Serious oversight of data mining operations that delivers a high de-
gree of accountability that data mining systems are used appropri-
ately, lawfully, and effectively. Components of such oversight
include review by an agency privacy officer, routine audits, agency
Inspector General investigations, and regular reports to Congress
and, to the extent consistent with the data mining context, the public.
It is important that the oversight be—and be seen to be—both rigor-
ous and independent.
It is striking that the justifications for these and other measures include
both privacy and security. There is widespread agreement that privacy is an
important right that is necessary to a productive life. Congress, and perhaps
the Supreme Court, need to act to restore the protection for privacy that
technology, legislative and judicial inaction, and the past missteps of these
two branches have eroded. The TAPAC final report could not have been
more explicit in its conclusion: “[i]nformational privacy is critical to partic-
ipation in democracy and society.”283
These undertakings, however, are also necessary to ensure that data
mining serves its intended purpose—whether detecting fraud or protecting
homeland security. With its seemingly insatiable quest for more data, the
government threatens to exacerbate what may be its greatest challenge in the
national security context: making sense of the data it already has. This point
has been highlighted by every group to consider government data mining.284
In addition to the government’s many domestic data sources, it also receives
more than 650 million intelligence intercepts every day.285 The problem is
not having too little data; it is having too much data and not being able to
make sense out of the data it has. It is “separating out the ‘signal’ of useful
information from the ‘noise’ of all of those data.”286 Jonas and Harper write
that the “key goal—and challenge—is to produce not just more information,
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but more useful information.”287 Data mining is essential to that objective,
but poor tools or inappropriate data do not merely fail to advance security,
they actively threaten it. In the words of the TAPAC report, a new regulatory
structure is necessary to “help protect civil liberties and national security,
and to help empower those responsible for defending our nation to use ad-
vanced information technologies—including data mining—appropriately
and effectively. It is time to update the law to respond to new challenges.”288
The need could not be greater, and thanks to the work of so many organiza-
tions which have addressed this issue, the broad outlines of a path forward
are clear. It only remains for Congress to act.
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